In response to Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, European Union leaders and institutions immediately and strongly condemned<\/a> Russian aggression and the violation of international law. The EU demands that Russia immediately ceases military actions, unconditionally withdraws all forces and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine and fully respects Ukraine\u2019s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The EU stands united in its unwavering support to Ukraine and has stepped up its political, humanitarian, financial and military support to the country. Since the Russian aggression started, the EU and its financial institutions have mobilised \u20ac50 billion<\/a> to support Ukraine\u2019s overall economic, social and financial resilience in the form of macro-financial assistance, budget support, emergency assistance, crisis response and humanitarian aid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In addition, military assistance measures are around \u20ac32 billion, bringing total support to Ukraine to over \u20ac82 billion. Together with the resources made available to help Member States cater for the needs of Ukrainians fleeing the war in the EU, the overall support to Ukraine and Ukrainians amounts to \u20ac99 billion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the same time, the EU has introduced an unprecedented package of sanctions against the Kremlin, as well as the Lukashenko regime in Belarus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The sanctions against Russia are the largest in the history of the European Union, and are designed to take a heavy toll on the Russian economy and the Kremlin.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Acting in close coordination with its partners and allies \u2013 NATO, G7, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, South Korea, Japan and Australia \u2013 the EU has agreed several waves of sanctions, on 23 February<\/strong><\/a> 2022 in response to Russian recognition of the non-government controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, followed by 14<\/strong> packages of sanctions<\/strong> since the invasion, first on 24 February<\/strong><\/a> in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and subsequently on 26 February<\/strong><\/a>, 28 February<\/strong><\/a>, <\/strong>15 March<\/strong><\/a>, 8 April<\/strong><\/a>, 30 May<\/strong><\/a>, 21 July<\/strong><\/a>, 6 October<\/strong><\/a>, 16 December 2022<\/strong><\/a>, 25 February 2023<\/strong><\/a>, 23 June<\/strong><\/a>, 18 December 2023,<\/strong><\/a> 23 February 2024 <\/strong><\/a>and 24 June 2024<\/strong><\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Financial<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The EU has excluded key Russian banks from SWIFT<\/strong>, the world\u2019s dominant financial messaging system for cross-border payments, targeting a first wave of banks on 2 March 2022<\/strong><\/a>, and adding a further three Russian credit institutions, including the country\u2019s largest bank Sberbank<\/strong> on 3 June<\/strong><\/a>. Three additional Russian banks were sanctioned on 16 December 2022<\/strong><\/a>, including a full transaction ban on the Russian Regional Development Bank to further paralyse Putin\u2019s cash machines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Cutting off Russia from the network will cause major disruption to its economy as it will severely restrict the country\u2019s access to global financial markets, and makes it difficult for Russian firms and individuals to pay for imported goods or receive payments for their exports. In addition, the EU has imposed a full transaction ban and asset freeze on <\/strong>four key Russian banks<\/strong><\/a>, which are now totally cut off from the markets. They represent 23% of market share in the Russian banking sector and will, therefore, further weaken Russia\u2019s financial system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The EU has also banned the transactions of Russia\u2019s central bank<\/strong><\/a>, the single most important financial institution in Russia. This paralyses billions in foreign reserves<\/strong>, potentially turning off the tap on Putin\u2019s war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n EU sanctions<\/a> further expand existing financial restrictions<\/strong>, cutting Russian access to the most important capital markets<\/strong>. They prohibit the listing and provision of services in relation to shares<\/strong> of Russian state-owned entities on EU trading venues<\/strong>, and introduce new measures which significantly limit the financial inflows<\/strong> from Russia to the EU, by prohibiting the acceptance of deposits exceeding certain values from Russian nationals or residents, the holding of accounts of Russian clients by the EU Central Securities Depositories, as well as the selling of euro-denominated securities to Russian clients. The sanctions include crypto-assets<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The EU has also banned the provision of any credit rating services<\/strong><\/a>, as well as access to any subscription services in relation to credit rating activities, to any Russian person or entity, which would result in them losing even further access to the EU\u2019s financial markets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On 3 June 2022, the EU also agreed to prohibit the provision of certain business-relevant services<\/strong><\/a>, such as accounting, auditing, statutory audit, bookkeeping and tax consulting services, business and management consulting, and public relations services to the Russian government, as well as to legal persons, entities or bodies established in Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On 24 June 2024, the EU also decided to outlaw the use of the \u2018System for Transfer of Financial Messages\u2019 (SPFS)<\/strong><\/a>, a specialised financial messaging service developed by the Central Bank of Russia to neutralise the effect of restrictive measures. EU entities operating outside Russia will be forbidden from connecting to the SPFS or equivalent specialised financial messaging services.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These sanctions target 70% of the Russian banking market, and key state-owned companies<\/strong>, including in the field of defence. They will increase Russia\u2019s borrowing costs, raise inflation and gradually erode Russia\u2019s industrial base. Additionally measures are taken to prevent the Russian elite\u2019s fortunes from being hidden in safe havens<\/strong> in Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Airspace and transport<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The European Union has shut down EU airspace<\/strong><\/a> for all Russian-owned, Russian registered or Russian-controlled aircraft, including private jets. They will no longer be able to land in, take off or overfly the territory of the EU.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On 8 April 2022<\/a>, the EU imposed an entry ban on Russian-flagged vessels <\/strong>to EU ports, and a ban ban on Russian and Belarusian freight road operators<\/strong> working in the EU. Certain exemptions will cover essentials, such as agricultural and food products, humanitarian aid as well as energy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On 24 June 2024<\/a>, the EU also introduced measures targeting Russia\u2019s \u2018shadow fleet\u2019 of tankers<\/strong> moving liquefied natural gas (LNG) through Europe and circumventing sanctions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The EU has also introduced an export ban covering goods and technology in the aviation and space industry<\/strong>, as well as a prohibition on the provision of insurance and reinsurance and maintenance services related to those goods and technology. Three quarters of Russia\u2019s current commercial air fleet were built in the EU, the US and Canada.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Energy<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n On 30 May 2022<\/a>, the EU agreed a ban on Russian oil imports<\/strong>. EU operators have also been barred from insuring and financing the transport, in particular through maritime routes, of Russian oil to third countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The EU has also prohibited the sale, supply, transfer or export to Russia of specific goods and technologies in oil refining<\/strong>, and introduced restrictions on the provision of related services.<\/p>\n\n\n\n By introducing such an export ban<\/strong><\/a>, the EU intends to hit the Russian oil sector, and make it impossible for Russia to upgrade its oil refineries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On 15 March<\/a>, the EU further prohibited new investments<\/strong> in the Russian energy sector, and introduced a comprehensive export restriction on equipment, technology and services for the energy industry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The fifth round of sanctions on 8 April 2022<\/a> imposed an import ban on all forms of Russian coal<\/strong>. This affects one fourth of all Russian coal exports, amounting to around \u20ac8 billion loss of revenue per year for Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The sanctions adopted on 6 October 2022<\/a> introduced into EU legislation the basis to put in place a price cap<\/strong> related to the maritime transport of Russian oil<\/strong> for third countries and further restrictions on the maritime transport of crude oil and petroleum products to third countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Technology<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The EU has imposed restrictions on exports of dual-use goods and technology<\/strong><\/a>, as well as restrictions on exports of certain goods and technology which might contribute to Russia\u2019s technological enhancement of its defence and security sector<\/strong>. This includes products such as semiconductors or cutting-edge technologies<\/strong>, as well as jet fuel and fuel additives, which may be used by the Russian army.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On 9 March 2022, the EU introduced additional restrictions on the export of maritime navigation and radio communication technology<\/strong><\/a>, added the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping to the list of state-owned enterprises subject to financing limitations and introduced a prior information sharing provision for exports of maritime safety equipment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On 8 April<\/a>, the EU introduced further targeted export bans<\/strong> in areas in which Russia is vulnerable due to its high dependency on EU supplies. This includes quantum computing, advanced semiconductors, sensitive machinery, transportation and chemicals. It also includes specialist catalysts for use in the refinery industry. <\/p>\n\n\n\n On 3 June<\/a>, the EU expanded its list of export restrictions to include additional chemicals that could be used in the process of manufacture of chemical weapons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The list of restricted items was extended on 6 October<\/a> to include certain electronic components, additional chemicals and goods that can be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The eighth sanctions package also prohibits the sale, supply, transfer or export of civilian firearms and their essential components and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The ninth sanctions package approved on 16 December 2022<\/a> added bans on the export of drone engines, camouflage gear, additional chemical\/biological equipment, riot control agents and additional electronic components found in Russian military systems on the battlefield, as well as additional industrial goods and technology, such as toy\/hobby drones, complex generator devices, laptop computers and computing components, printed circuits, radio navigational systems, radio remote control apparatus, aircraft engines and parts of engines, cameras and lenses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The 11th package of sanctions<\/a> included a new anti-circumvention tool allowing the EU to restrict the sale, supply, transfer or export of specified sanctioned goods and technology to certain third countries whose jurisdictions are considered to be at continued and particularly high risk of circumvention.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On 23 February 2024<\/a>, the EU introduced additional export bans on drone components.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Industry<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n On 15 March 2022<\/a>, the EU introduced trade restrictions concerning iron and steel<\/strong>, amounting to approximately \u20ac3.3 billion in lost export revenue for Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Trade<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The EU, together with other World Trade Organization (WTO) members, agreed on 15 March 2022<\/a> to deny Russian products and services most favoured nation<\/strong> treatment in EU markets. This follows an announcement<\/a> on 11 March by G7 members. This will suspend the significant benefits that Russia enjoys as a WTO member.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The EU has also imposed import bans<\/a> on cement, rubber products, wood, spirits (including vodka), liquor, and high-end seafood (including caviar). On 21 July<\/a>, it added a ban on the import of gold originating in Russia. Trade restrictions were extended on 6 October<\/a> to include machinery and appliances, plastics, vehicles, textiles, footwear, leather, ceramics, certain chemical products, wood pulp and paper, cigarettes, cosmetics as well as elements used in the jewellery industry such as stones and precious metals, that altogether generate significant revenues for Russia. In its 12th package of sanctions on 18 December 2023<\/a>, the EU also imposed an import ban on Russian diamonds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Media<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The EU has suspended the broadcasting activities of <\/strong>Sputnik and RT\/Russia Today<\/strong><\/a> as well as Rossiya RTR\/RTR Planeta, Rossiya 24\/Russia 24, and TV Centre International<\/strong><\/a> \u2013 identified among the most important pro-Kremlin disinformation outlets targeting audiences in Ukraine and the EU, and disseminating propaganda in support of Russia\u2019s aggression against Ukraine. As part of its ninth sanctions package, NTV, Pervyi Kanal, Rossiya 1 and REN TV<\/strong><\/a> were added to the list of sanctioned media.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This measure will be effective until the aggression against Ukraine is put to an end, and until the Russian Federation and its associated outlets cease to conduct disinformation and information manipulation actions against the EU and its member states.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Restrictive measures<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Restrictive measures now apply to over 2,200 individuals and entities<\/strong>: they include an asset freeze<\/strong> and a prohibition from making funds available to the listed individuals and entities. In addition, a travel ban<\/strong> applicable to the listed persons prevents these from entering or transiting through EU territory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The list includes the Russian President and Foreign Minister<\/strong>, the members of the National Security Council<\/strong> who supported Russia\u2019s recognition of the two non-government controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, all the members of the Russian State Duma<\/strong>, who ratified the government decision of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Russian Federation and the two entities. It also includes oligarchs and businessmen<\/strong> active in the oil, banking and finance sectors<\/strong>, and the metallurgical, agriculture, pharmaceutical, telecom and digital industries<\/strong>, as well as government members,<\/strong> high-level military personalities and senior military officials involved in atrocities in Ukraine<\/strong>, and propagandists<\/strong> who have contributed to spread anti-Ukrainian propaganda and promote a positive attitude towards the invasion of Ukraine. From 6 October, it also includes those involved in Russia\u2019s occupation, illegal annexation, and sham \u201creferenda\u201d<\/strong> in the occupied territories\/oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The EU has also decided to prohibit all transactions with certain state-owned enterprises across different sectors \u2013 the Kremlin\u2019s military-industrial complex<\/strong>, and on 6 October banned EU nationals from holding any posts on the governing bodies of Russian state-owned or controlled legal persons, entities or bodies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In addition, diplomats, other Russian officials, and businesspeople will no longer be able to benefit from visa facilitation<\/strong> provisions, which allow privileged access to the EU. This decision will not affect ordinary Russian citizens.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The EU has also taken measures to limit the sale of citizenship \u2013 so-called golden passports<\/strong> \u2013 that allow wealthy Russians to become EU citizens, and has introduced an EU export ban on luxury goods<\/strong> (e.g. luxury cars, jewelry, etc.) to directly hit Russian elites.<\/p>\n\n\n\n You can find all the latest sanctions updates on our\u00a0#StandWithUkraine<\/a>\u00a0page and on the European Commission\u2019s\u00a0page on\u00a0EU sanctions against Russia following the invasion of Ukraine<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Lukashenko regime in Belarus is supporting the Russian military aggression<\/strong> against Ukraine by allowing Russia to fire ballistic missiles from the Belarusian territory, enabling transportation of Russian military personnel and heavy weapons, tanks, and military transporters, allowing Russian military aircraft to fly over Belarusian airspace into Ukraine, providing refuelling points, and storing Russian weapons and military equipment in Belarus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In response, the EU has imposed sanctions<\/strong><\/a> targeting those in Belarus who collaborate with these attacks against Ukraine and restricting trade in a number of key sectors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A total of 42<\/strong> high<\/strong>-ranked members of Belarusian military personnel<\/strong> face restrictive measures for their role in the war, which include an asset freeze and travel ban.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Furthermore, the EU has introduced restrictions in the trade of goods<\/strong> used for the production or manufacturing of tobacco<\/strong> products, mineral fuels<\/strong>, bituminous substances<\/strong> and gaseous hydrocarbon products<\/strong>, potassium chloride (\u201cpotash<\/strong>\u201d) products, wood<\/strong> products, cement<\/strong> products, iron and steel <\/strong>products and rubber<\/strong> products. There are also restrictions on exports of dual-use goods and technology<\/strong>, and certain advanced goods and technology which might contribute to Belarus\u2019 military, technological, defence and security development<\/strong>, together with restrictions on the provision of related services.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On 9 March 2022<\/a>, the EU introduced SWIFT prohibitions against three Belarusian banks<\/strong> \u2013 Belagroprombank, Bank Dabrabyt, and the Development Bank of the Republic of Belarus \u2013 adding the Belarusian Bank For Development And Reconstruction on 3 June<\/a>. It also prohibited transactions with the Central Bank of Belarus<\/strong> related to the management of reserves or assets, and the provision of public financing for trade with and investment in Belarus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On 3 August 2023<\/a>, the EU introduced a series of additional restrictive measures, aligning the Belarus sanctions with the Russia sanctions regime<\/strong>. These include an export ban on goods and technology suited for use in aviation and the space industry, including aircraft engines and drones; a prohibition of the sale, supply, transfer or export of firearms, their parts and essential components and ammunition; further export restrictions on goods used by Russia for its war of aggression against Ukraine, including semiconductor devices, electronic integrated circuits, manufacturing and testing equipment, photographic cameras and optical components; and an extended export ban on dual-use goods and technology.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The EU also imposed sanctions against an additional 38 individuals and 3 entities from Belarus who are responsible for\u00a0serious human rights violations<\/strong>, contribute to the repression of civil society and democratic forces, as well as those who benefit from and support the Lukashenko regime. Altogether, EU restrictive measures on Belarus now apply to a total of\u00a0233 individuals and 37 entities<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another taboo has fallen, in the words of EU High Representative Josep Borrell: for the first time in its history, the EU is providing lethal equipment<\/a> to a third country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The EU initially agreed<\/a> in February 2022 to mobilise \u20ac500 million through the European Peace Facility<\/a> to finance the supply of lethal and non-lethal material<\/strong> to the Ukrainian army<\/strong>, with additional tranches subsequently bringing the total to \u20ac11.1 billion<\/strong><\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The agreed measures will finance both the provision of equipment and supplies<\/strong> to the Ukrainian Armed Forces by EU Member States, including personal protective equipment, first aid kits and fuel, as well as military equipment designed to deliver lethal force<\/strong> for defensive purposes. <\/p>\n\n\n\n In addition, the EU on 17 October 2022 agreed to set up a two-year Military Assistance Mission<\/strong><\/a> in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine), providing training to the Ukrainian armed forces and coordination and synchronisation of member states\u2019 own training support for Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In total,\u00a0EU military support for Ukraine<\/a>\u00a0\u2013 provided by the European Peace Facility and the Member States directly \u2013 is around\u00a0\u20ac32\u00a0billion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n A total of \u20ac926<\/strong> million<\/strong> has been made available for humanitarian aid projects<\/strong> to help civilians affected by the war in Ukraine. This includes \u20ac860 million for Ukraine<\/strong> and \u20ac66 million for Moldova<\/strong> to provide assistance to people fleeing Ukraine. This EU humanitarian aid provides food, water, healthcare, shelter and other basic needs, as well as a winter shelter programme<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another \u20ac330 million<\/strong> goes to an emergency support programme that helps to secure access to basic goods and services<\/strong>, such as to education, healthcare and food. It also helps to protect the population, both internally displaced people and of their host communities and to support small and medium enterprises and agriculture. Another important goal is to reconstruct civilian small-scale infrastructure, ensure energy security, and strengthen cyber security, media freedom and actions against disinformation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the \u2018Stand Up for Ukraine\u2019<\/a> global pledging event on 9 April 2022, launched by the European Commission and Canada, \u20ac9.1 billion was raised for people fleeing the Russian invasion, inside Ukraine and abroad, including \u20ac1 billion from the European Commission. On top of that, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has announced an additional \u20ac1 billion in loan to cover the needs of the people displaced by the invasion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The EU is also providing large-scale support to Ukraine<\/strong> itself to help it withstand the crisis, including emergency macro-financial assistance of up to \u20ac25.2 billion in the form of loans, and an additional \u20ac620 million to Ukraine in budget support. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The Commission is also coordinating the delivery of material assistance<\/strong> via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism<\/a> to Ukraine, with offers from all 27 EU Member States, as well as Norway, Turkey, North Macedonia, Iceland and Serbia, in what is now the largest ever activation of the Mechanism. The assistance includes over 80 million items<\/strong> such as first aid kits, shelter equipment, firefighting equipment, water pumps, power generators, and fuel, and the EU keeps receiving new offers every day. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Moldova has also activated the Mechanism to support Ukrainians arriving to their country. Already Austria, France and the Netherlands have offered emergency support such as shelter items and medical assistance to Moldova. On 3 March, the EU announced<\/a> immediate support of \u20ac15 million to Moldova<\/strong>, and an additional \u20ac5 million<\/strong> in civil protection aid.<\/p>\n\n\n\nThe EU promised \u2018massive sanctions\u2019 against Russia: what do those sanctions actually mean?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
What about Belarus? Is it also facing EU sanctions for its role in the war?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The EU says it will supply military equipment to Ukraine: what does this mean in practice?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
What about humanitarian support?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n