{"id":3102,"date":"2024-11-01T11:13:12","date_gmt":"2024-11-01T11:13:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/?p=3102"},"modified":"2024-11-01T11:13:12","modified_gmt":"2024-11-01T11:13:12","slug":"racing-to-rearm","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/2024\/11\/01\/racing-to-rearm\/","title":{"rendered":"Racing to Rearm"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

01\/11\/2024
By Andrew Drwiega<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n

\n
\"\"<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n

The annual MSPO defence industry gathering in Poland this September comes at a time when Eastern European countries are looking to rapidly modernise following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The defence of Eastern Europe has undergone a seismic shift in strategy and requirements following Russia\u2019s illegal invasion of Ukraine, firstly by seizing the Crimea in 2014 and then the invasion of the Northern and Eastern Ukraine in February 2022.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This has been of such concern to the West\u2019s major defence partnership, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) that it has increased its forward NATO\u2019s forward presence in countries bordering Russia \u201cby establishing multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia.\u201d This has also resulted in a greater number of aircraft, naval vessels and troops being deployed, between and including the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Following the 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid, these eight multinational battlegroups were to be prepared for expansion from battalion to brigade sized groups the reinforcement exercises were established. However, according to a NATO statement, the battlegroups are not identical: \u201ctheir sizes and compositions are tailored to specific geographic factors and threats. Overall, military requirements guide each battlegroup\u2019s composition.\u201d In all countries the battlegroups work and train with the forces of the host nation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As of July 2023, the eight battlegroups are composed of the following Allies:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \n
  1. Host nation:\u00a0Bulgaria<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Framework nation: Italy<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

    Contributing nations: Albania, Greece, Montenegro, North Macedonia, T\u00fcrkiye and the United States<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    2. Host nation:\u00a0Estonia<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Framework nation: United Kingdom<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Contributing nations: Denmark, France and Iceland<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    3. Host nation: Hungary<\/strong> \u2013 Framework nation: Hungary<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Contributing nations: Croatia, Italy, T\u00fcrkiye and the United States<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    4. Host nation: Latvia<\/strong> \u2013 Framework nation: Canada<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Contributing nations: Albania, Czechia, Iceland, Italy, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    5. Host nation: Lithuania<\/strong> \u2013 Framework nation: Germany<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Contributing nations: Belgium, Croatia, Czechia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and the United States<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    6. Host nation: Poland<\/strong> \u2013 Framework nation: United States<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Contributing nations: Croatia, Romania and the United Kingdom<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    7. Host nation: Romania<\/strong> \u2013 Framework nation: France<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Contributing nations: Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, North Macedonia, Poland, Portugal and the United States<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    8. Host nation: Slovakia<\/strong> \u2013 Framework nation: Czechia<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Contributing nations: Germany, Slovenia and the United States<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Rapid Reinforcement<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

    Backing up the battlegroups is a strategy of reinforcement, both rapid and longer term for heavier forces. These comprise: NATO\u2019s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), the broader NATO Response Force, Allies\u2019 additional high-readiness forces and NATO\u2019s heavier follow-on forces. However, during the 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid, a new NATO Force Model was agreed which would see an expansion of high-readiness forces, although this is not due to completed until the end of the year at the earliest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    To increase readiness and rapid reinforcement NATO\u2019s plans are multi-dimensional. They combine additional pre-positioning of weapons and other stores, more forward deployed capabilities such as ground based air defence (GBAD, strengthened command and control (C2) and more detailed plans to defend specific allies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Poland on the Front Line\u2026Again<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

    One aspect of Poland\u2019s reputation is its habit of being a front-line state, or a crossroads for strategic power struggles. Its fate at the start of World War II is well documented \u2013 the Katyn forest massacre by the Russians will not be forgotten \u2013 as well as the subjugation of the population under the Soviet Union during the Cold War, in common with other ex-Communist Bloc countries that are now NATO members.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    As a full NATO member, Poland has been following a course to modernise its armed forces away from all Soviet era equipment, a significant task. Its defence spending, once relatively low, has increased with the Russian invasion of Ukraine and now the Wagner Group being based in Belarus has done nothing to ease security concerns. The government stated that defence spending in 2023 would rise to three percent of gross domestic product (GDP).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    In October 2019, the Polish Ministry of National Defense began a 15-year \u2018Technical Modernisation Plan 2020-2035,\u2019 which included several important procurement programs. As well as the need to extensively modernise its forces, as is the trend now, Poland has also been keen to secure Polish industry participation in the acquisition of foreign military products, particularly companies within the Polish Armament Group (PGZ). This would take the form of investment, technology transfer, and\/or co-production through numerous defence programmes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Poland has demonstrated a willingness to adopt NATO standard equipment through its growing procurement requirement. Recent purchases have included 250 General Dynamics Land Systems enhanced M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams for $4.75 billion in 2022 with a further order for another 116 in 2023 worth $1.4 billion through the WILK programme. Following this order, Romania has also expressed an interest in purchasing up to a battalion\u2019s worth of the M1A2 Abrams tanks.<\/p>\n\n\n

    \n
    \"\"<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n

    Poland is also joining the ranks of Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II operators. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) gave its approval in 2019 for Lockheed Martin to provide 32 F-35As with Technology Refresh 3 (TR-3) and Block 4 capabilities for the Polish Air Force in line with the HARPIA programme. The first entered the production line in Marietta, Georgia at the beginning of April this year with deliveries expected to begin in 2024 through to 2030.<\/p>\n\n\n

    \n
    \"\"<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n

    A contract was agreed in April this year for Poland to shore-up its air defence capability through the $2.4 billion acquisition of MBDA\u2019s Common Anti-air Modular Missiles (CAMM), together with iLaunchers. According to the company, the order is for the \u201cmodernisation and manufacture of a total of 22 PILICA+ air defence batteries \u2013 making it the largest European short-range air defence acquisition programme in NATO.\u201d CAMM can defend from air threats out to around 16 miles (25km), using its multi-channel, radar-guided, all-weather ability. It will work with Poland\u2019s existing PILICA+ system. As being witnessed in Ukraine air, and particularly drone, attacks caused concern among some NATO members aware of their own potential vulnerability without sufficient ground-based air defence (GBAD) resources.<\/p>\n\n\n

    \n
    \"\"<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n

    Longer range fires has also been addressed with the arrival in May of the first of 18 Lockheed Martin advanced combat HIMARS launchers and two HIMARS training launchers, with ammunition and related equipment. The order cost the Polish Defense Ministry $414 million.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Local production in Poland had already been assured between Rafael Advanced Defence Systems and Polish company Mesko over the production in-country of Spike missiles. The newest order worth around $100 million is for hundreds of the latest Spike-LR (long range) missiles ensures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    SpikeLR is a fifth-generation stand-off missile non-line-of-sight (NLOS) missile carrying up to four warheads. It has a range of up to 3.4 miles (5,5km) and, according to Rafael, \u201cis immune to GPS jamming and can be configured to different firing approaches.\u201d Due to reduced weight an infantry operator is now able to carry a pair of missiles.<\/p>\n\n\n

    \n
    \"\"<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n

    In 2022 Northrop Grumman announced that it had delivered the first of six production Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) Engagement Operations Centres as part of a US Government contract with Poland. The IBCS contributes into the Polish Government\u2019s WISLA programme which will integrate its Patriot-based medium air and missile defense with the IBCS. Poland is also the first international Foreign Military Sale (FMS) country to receive the IBCS.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The decision by Sweden and Finland to join NATO, after working alongside the organisation for many years, has also seen their defence spending increase. Since the invasion of Ukraine, which provided a final catalyst for the decisions, according to a document released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) on 24 April, \u201csome of the sharpest increases were seen in Finland (+36 percent), Lithuania (+27 percent), Sweden (+12 percent) and Poland (+11 percent).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    However, tension has been building for nearly a decade. Lorenzo Scarazzato, researcher with SIPRI\u2019s Military Expenditure and Arms Production programme stated: \u2018Many former Eastern Bloc states have more than doubled their military spending since 2014, the year when Russia annexed Crimea.\u2019<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Russia is now clearly boosting its war footing and, according to SIPRI: \u201cRussian military spending grew by an estimated 9.2 percent in 2022, to around $86.4 billion. This was equivalent to 4.1 per cent of Russia\u2019s GDP in 2022, up from 3.7 percent of GDP in 2021.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Although Poland is clearly ahead in its increased defence spending from 2022 to 2023, Romania, Hungary, Czech and Slovakia have also significantly increased their defence spending. According to data research company Statista, Poland has increased from $16.5 billion to $29 billion; Romania from $5.1 billion to $8.4 billion; Hungary from $3.2 billion to $5 billion; Czech from $3.8 billion to $5 billion; and Slovakia from $2 billion to $2.6 billion.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    01\/11\/2024 By Andrew Drwiega The annual MSPO defence industry gathering in Poland this September comes at a time when Eastern…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[29],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3102","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-europe"],"views":608,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3102","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3102"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3102\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3109,"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3102\/revisions\/3109"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3102"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3102"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3102"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}