{"id":3426,"date":"2025-05-20T08:42:06","date_gmt":"2025-05-20T08:42:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/?p=3426"},"modified":"2025-05-20T08:42:06","modified_gmt":"2025-05-20T08:42:06","slug":"russian-military-budget-limits-of-sustainability","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/2025\/05\/20\/russian-military-budget-limits-of-sustainability\/","title":{"rendered":"Russian Military Budget: Limits of\u00a0Sustainability"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">20.05.2025<br>By\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/ridl.io\/auth\/vladislav-inozemtsev-2\/\">Vladislav Inozemtsev<\/a><br><a href=\"https:\/\/ridl.io\/russian-military-budget-limits-of-sustainability\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/ridl.io\/russian-military-budget-limits-of-sustainability\/\">Source<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-large\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"683\" src=\"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-18-1024x683.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-3428\" srcset=\"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-18-1024x683.png 1024w, https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-18-300x200.png 300w, https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-18-768x512.png 768w, https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/image-18.png 1440w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Vladislav Inozemtsev on\u00a0the Russian economy\u2019s ability to\u00a0sustain current levels of\u00a0military spending over the next 12\u221218 months<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Recent events\u2014fading hopes for a&nbsp;quick ceasefire in&nbsp;Ukraine,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.kommersant.ru\/doc\/7695546\">a&nbsp;rapid slowdown<\/a>&nbsp;of&nbsp;the Russian economy, and a&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.rbc.ru\/economics\/13\/04\/2025\/67fba6c69a79473e85cb9385\">sharp drop in&nbsp;oil prices<\/a>&nbsp;amid Donald Trump\u2019s \u00abtariff wars\u00bb and OPEC\u2019s decision to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.opec.org\/pr-detail\/243563-03-may-2025.html\">increase production<\/a>\u2014have raised doubts about the Kremlin\u2019s ability to&nbsp;continue funding its military ventures at&nbsp;current levels.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Kremlin initially did not anticipate such a&nbsp;costly operation. In&nbsp;2022, it&nbsp;was envisioned as&nbsp;a&nbsp;blitzkrieg with minimal expenses, but by&nbsp;autumn, the salaries of&nbsp;contract soldiers had to&nbsp;be&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.interfax.ru\/russia\/871426\">drastically increased<\/a>&nbsp;(by&nbsp;4.2\u22124.4 times compared to&nbsp;peacetime). In&nbsp;September 2023, the Ministry of&nbsp;Finance&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.forbes.ru\/finansy\/497441-minfin-zaplaniroval-uvelicenie-rashodov-na-oboronu-v-2024-godu-pocti-na-70\">planned to&nbsp;cut<\/a>&nbsp;defense spending for 2025, but the final 2025\u22122027 budget&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/meduza.io\/news\/2024\/12\/01\/putin-podpisal-zakon-o-trehletnem-byudzhete-rf-v-2025-godu-v-nem-zalozheny-rekordnye-rashody-na-voynu\">saw a&nbsp;59% increase<\/a>&nbsp;compared to&nbsp;the 2024\u22122026 projections. Moreover, it&nbsp;was hard to&nbsp;foresee that the occupation of&nbsp;Ukraine and the destruction of&nbsp;its statehood would&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.memri.org\/reports\/will-putin-attack-europe\">so&nbsp;consume Vladimir Putin<\/a>&nbsp;that he&nbsp;would reject any serious compromises. Economic arguments no&nbsp;longer influence his decisions. Finally, it&nbsp;was difficult to&nbsp;predict that fiscal management would boost federal budget revenues from&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/duma.gov.ru\/news\/57484\/\">27.8 trillion<\/a>&nbsp;rubles in&nbsp;2022 to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.rbc.ru\/economics\/30\/04\/2025\/6812652b9a7947efca2f3469\">38.5 trillion in&nbsp;2025<\/a>&nbsp;(similar increase&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/ruxpert.ru\/%D0%A1%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B0:%D0%91%D1%8E%D0%B4%D0%B6%D0%B5%D1%82_%D0%A0%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B8\">took 8 years<\/a>&nbsp;from 2012 to&nbsp;2020). In&nbsp;short, the war has proven far more expensive than anticipated\u2014but, paradoxically, not as&nbsp;unsustainable as&nbsp;it&nbsp;might seem.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Can Russia afford to&nbsp;keep fighting, and how long can it&nbsp;last? This question has been asked since the war\u2019s outset, often with incorrect answers pointing to&nbsp;a&nbsp;moment when the system would \u00abcollapse.\u00bb The author of&nbsp;this article and his colleagues&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/case-center.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/Dictators-Reliable-Rear-241108-ru-3.pdf\">argued last year<\/a>&nbsp;that Russia\u2019s economy could indefinitely fund a&nbsp;war of&nbsp;this intensity. Despite recent events fueling renewed talk of&nbsp;an&nbsp;imminent collapse, this view holds, with clarifications.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">First, military spending in&nbsp;2025 will likely reach its real-term ceiling. From 2022\u22122025, it&nbsp;grew 3.79 times (31.3%, 36.8%, 62.2%, and 29.9% annually)&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/xn----ctbjnaatncev9av3a8f8b.xn--p1ai\/%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%B1%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%86%D1%8B-%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%84%D0%BB%D1%8F%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B8\">against 35.2%<\/a>&nbsp;cumulative inflation. In&nbsp;2026, nominal growth may continue but will likely fall below official inflation rates, or&nbsp;there may be&nbsp;no&nbsp;nominal growth at&nbsp;all. This is&nbsp;unsurprising: the war has become positional, drones and cheaper combat tools are increasingly used, contract soldiers\u2019 incomes&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.memri.org\/reports\/important-new-trends-russian-military\">are stagnant<\/a>, and inflated regional enlistment bonuses are declining. The Kremlin\u2019s goal is&nbsp;to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.svoboda.org\/a\/putin-trebuet-chetyre-oblasti-ukrainy-vneshnee-upravlenie-i-swift-chem-otvetit-tramp-\/33363755.html\">capture the four Ukrainian regions<\/a>&nbsp;\u00abannexed\u00bb to&nbsp;Russia, after which diplomacy may take over. This suggests military spending growth could halt, a&nbsp;baseline scenario for 2026\u22122028, though significant cuts are unlikely as&nbsp;investments in&nbsp;defense industries&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.moscowtimes.ru\/2025\/05\/08\/rossiya-nachala-rasshiryat-zavod-po-proizvodstvu-vzrivchatki-v-sibiri-chtobi-uvelichit-vipusk-artilleriiskih-snaryadov-a162997\">continue<\/a>&nbsp;and existing capacities remain utilized, as&nbsp;Putin has&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/tass.ru\/ekonomika\/19998225\">openly stated<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Second, 2025\u22122026 will be&nbsp;pivotal for Russia\u2019s economy, as&nbsp;military spending\u2019s role as&nbsp;a&nbsp;growth driver is&nbsp;nearly exhausted. The liquid portion of&nbsp;the National Wealth Fund (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.interfax.ru\/business\/1017937\">3.27 trillion rubles<\/a>) may be&nbsp;depleted by&nbsp;year-end to&nbsp;cover a&nbsp;projected&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.interfax.ru\/russia\/1024371\">3.79 trillion ruble deficit<\/a>, especially at&nbsp;current oil prices. Economic growth in&nbsp;2022\u22122024 was fueled by&nbsp;spending previously saved reserves, a&nbsp;tactic no&nbsp;longer viable. The Central Bank\u2019s 21% interest rate&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.cbr.ru\/vfs\/statistics\/BankSector\/Borrowings\/02_01_Funds_all.xlsx\">has driven 21.1 trillion rubles<\/a>&nbsp;into deposits since mid-2023, curbing consumption and stalling civilian sectors, which may see&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.dw.com\/ru\/vot-i-recessia-kak-vojna-tormozit-ekonomiku-rf\/a-72419906\">mild contraction<\/a>&nbsp;or&nbsp;stagnation in&nbsp;2025. Increased state spending no&nbsp;longer delivers the multiplier effect it&nbsp;did early in&nbsp;the war. The so-called \u00ab<a href=\"https:\/\/ridl.io\/putin-s-deathonomics\/\">deathonomics<\/a>\u00bb has lost its role as&nbsp;an&nbsp;economic engine, at&nbsp;least temporarily, as&nbsp;it&nbsp;has become routine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Third, uncertainty surrounds Russia\u2019s key export\u2014hydrocarbons. While 2022\u22122024 challenges (e.g., losing European markets, Nord Stream sabotage, oil price caps, and the need for a&nbsp;\u00abshadow fleet\u00bb) were mitigated by&nbsp;redirecting trade, 2025 brings a&nbsp;systemic issue: a&nbsp;20%&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/oilprice.com\/oil-price-charts\/#Brent-Crude\">drop<\/a>&nbsp;in&nbsp;global oil prices, which may continue. This complicates finances but isn\u2019t catastrophic. The ruble\u2019s 20%&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2025-04-15\/ruble-surges-as-best-performing-global-currency-outpacing-gold\">appreciation<\/a>&nbsp;in&nbsp;2025 (driven by&nbsp;anti-inflation measures, attractive ruble deposits, and de-escalation rhetoric with the U.S.) has cut the ruble price of&nbsp;oil from&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.economy.gov.ru\/search\/?d=all&amp;d_from=&amp;d_to=&amp;e=0&amp;m=&amp;q=%D1%8E%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%81&amp;s=&amp;search=1&amp;t=\">6.3\u22127.5 thousand<\/a>&nbsp;rubles per barrel in&nbsp;late 2024 to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/ru.investing.com\/news\/general\/article-2746350\">4 thousand<\/a>&nbsp;by&nbsp;May. Authorities may weaken the ruble to&nbsp;125 per dollar by&nbsp;year-end as&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.forbes.ru\/milliardery\/536713-deripaska-predupredil-o-dollare-za-115-125-rublej-pri-cenah-na-neft-v-45-za-barrel\">some have already suggested<\/a>, halving the deficit and easing monetary overhang without&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.moscowtimes.ru\/2025\/05\/06\/dengi-vashi-stali-nashi-pochemu-gosudarstvo-kosit-glaz-na-depoziti-grazhdan-a162825\">freezing deposits<\/a>. Meanwhile, Central Bank reserves&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.cbr.ru\/hd_base\/mrrf\/mrrf_7d\/\">grew<\/a>&nbsp;by&nbsp;over $&nbsp;67 billion recently, exceeding the 2025 deficit by&nbsp;1.5 times,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/cbr.ru\/hd_base\/mrrf\/mrrf_m\/?UniDbQuery.Posted=True&amp;UniDbQuery.From=01.1998&amp;UniDbQuery.To=03.2025\">bolstered<\/a>&nbsp;by&nbsp;2,100 tons of&nbsp;gold valued at&nbsp;a&nbsp;record $&nbsp;3,400&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/goldprice.org\/\">per ounce<\/a>. Thus, Russia has alternative deficit-financing options, though their use remains uncertain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Fourth, anticipating economic slowdown and lower revenue growth, authorities raised corporate and personal income taxes in&nbsp;2024. Record financial results in&nbsp;2023\u22122024 (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.akm.ru\/news\/saldirovannaya_pribyl_rossiyskikh_predpriyatiy_v_2023_godu_vyrosla_na_35_2\/\">33.3<\/a>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.rbc.ru\/economics\/05\/03\/2025\/67c83ca59a7947ad36ab4c21\">30.4 trillion rubles<\/a>) ensure tax hikes will yield results: non-oil and gas revenues&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.interfax.ru\/business\/1024522\">rose<\/a>&nbsp;13.5% year-on-year in&nbsp;January-April 2025, with federal personal income tax up&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.interfax.ru\/business\/1024376\">over 16%.<\/a>&nbsp;Further tax increases in&nbsp;2025 may target large corporations, even those with \u00abpaper\u00bb profits (the way it&nbsp;happened with Gazprom&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/tass.ru\/ekonomika\/23827901\">trillion rubles profit<\/a>). Record tariff hikes for natural monopolies&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.ng.ru\/economics\/2025-05-04\/1_9246_tariffs.html\">have been approved<\/a>&nbsp;to&nbsp;ensure taxable profits. These measures could raise 2\u22123 trillion rubles in&nbsp;2026 alone. Unlike volatile export revenues, tax income remains a&nbsp;reliable budget pillar. However, 2025 military spending is&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.moscowtimes.ru\/2024\/11\/27\/otvoini-kak-razvlecheniya-kvoine-kak-glavnoi-funktsii-rossii-a148766\">set to&nbsp;exceed<\/a>&nbsp;oil and gas revenues for the first time, a&nbsp;historic shift (for example, in&nbsp;2001\u22122013 they&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/ru.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/%D0%92%D0%BE%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B9_%D0%B1%D1%8E%D0%B4%D0%B6%D0%B5%D1%82_%D0%A0%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B8\">made up&nbsp;29\u221236%<\/a>&nbsp;of&nbsp;this revenue category). Realigning military spending with hydrocarbon revenues in&nbsp;2026 would ease fiscal strain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Summing up&nbsp;interim results, it\u2019s worth acknowledging that in&nbsp;2025\u22122026, Russia can afford to&nbsp;spend 13\u221215 trillion rubles annually on&nbsp;military needs, which is&nbsp;likely to&nbsp;be&nbsp;reflected in&nbsp;budget guidelines (it\u2019s too early to&nbsp;say what these will be, as&nbsp;recent years show that three-year budgets don\u2019t provide an&nbsp;accurate picture: each, including the 2025\u22122027 budget, has assumed military spending would decrease from the second year of&nbsp;the \u00abthree-year plan,\u00bb but this hasn\u2019t happened). Meanwhile, the military-political situation remains extremely complex, if&nbsp;not increasingly&nbsp;so. Many military experts&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/english.nv.ua\/nation\/zaluzhnyi-highlighted-several-facts-of-reality-about-the-world-and-russia-s-war-against-ukraine-50459472.html\">argue<\/a>, with good reason, that Ukraine and its Western allies adapt far more quickly to&nbsp;the changing nature of&nbsp;warfare than Russia: drones and advanced remote combat systems are widely used, artificial intelligence and cutting-edge enemy tracking methods are applied. Russia, however, continues to&nbsp;rely on&nbsp;superiority in&nbsp;manpower and heavy weaponry. The Kremlin likely has no&nbsp;\u00abPlan B\u00bb: if&nbsp;the front deteriorates, it&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.moscowtimes.ru\/2025\/04\/30\/kreml-zayavil-ogotovnosti-kmobilizatsii-kak-vvelikuyu-otechestvennuyu-voinu-a162480\">hopes for<\/a>&nbsp;a&nbsp;\u00abmobilization like during the Great Patriotic War,\u00bb which is&nbsp;unlikely to&nbsp;secure victory but could irreparably harm the economy. Such a&nbsp;turn of&nbsp;events seems the only scenario where Russia could lose the war\u2014not due to&nbsp;economic issues but because of&nbsp;an&nbsp;inability to&nbsp;counter a&nbsp;significantly strengthened enemy on&nbsp;the front.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Besides the baseline scenario (a&nbsp;positional war with no&nbsp;major changes over 12 months), two less likely scenarios should be&nbsp;considered.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The first, which we\u2019ll call \u00abcatastrophic,\u00bb could combine all negative trends: a&nbsp;drop in&nbsp;Russian oil prices to $&nbsp;40\/barrel or&nbsp;lower; secondary sanctions reducing Russia\u2019s raw material exports by&nbsp;20\u221230% in&nbsp;physical terms, etc. In&nbsp;this case, budget revenues could fall by&nbsp;about one-fifth, or&nbsp;7\u22128 trillion rubles, and the deficit could rise from the current 1.7% to&nbsp;over 4% of&nbsp;GDP. This scenario would require drastic measures, but even then, significant cuts to&nbsp;military spending are unlikely. The authorities would cover the shortfall through borrowing (some of&nbsp;which would merely disguise Central Bank emission), depleting the National Wealth Fund,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.rbc.ru\/economics\/18\/03\/2025\/67d91e759a79473d09dd3be4\">attempting to&nbsp;sell<\/a>&nbsp;state company shares (or&nbsp;rather, \u00abdistributing\u00bb them to&nbsp;state banks with elements of&nbsp;coercion), and, of&nbsp;course,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.ng.ru\/economics\/2025-04-23\/4_9241_siluanov.html\">cutting spending<\/a>&nbsp;(primarily on&nbsp;infrastructure and partly on&nbsp;social programs). These measures could provide the necessary funds for 12\u221218 months. More radical options, like fully seizing state bank profits (in&nbsp;2024, the banking system\u2019s total profit&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.rbc.ru\/finances\/30\/01\/2025\/679b28609a79473d36d876e6\">was<\/a>&nbsp;3.8 trillion rubles, with 80% from state banks) and issuing \u00abwar bonds,\u00bb also remain. Even in&nbsp;the worst-case scenario, the Kremlin will seek ways to&nbsp;fully fund its military program rather than \u00aboptimize\u00bb it. We&nbsp;don\u2019t assume economic problems alone, without the military escalation mentioned earlier, could end the conflict. Russian troops can be&nbsp;destroyed or&nbsp;pushed back from occupied positions through increased firepower or&nbsp;effective Ukrainian mobilization, but not by&nbsp;provoking a&nbsp;crisis in&nbsp;\u00abPutinomics.\u00bb For Russia\u2019s economic flaws to&nbsp;translate into weaknesses in&nbsp;the Kremlin\u2019s war machine, it&nbsp;would need to&nbsp;operate in&nbsp;highly unfavorable conditions for two to&nbsp;three years. Over a&nbsp;12\u221218-month horizon, there\u2019s no&nbsp;reason to&nbsp;expect a&nbsp;catastrophe from changing economic conditions. Stagnation or&nbsp;even recession is&nbsp;possible, but not a&nbsp;reduction in&nbsp;military spending or&nbsp;a&nbsp;loss of&nbsp;ability to&nbsp;continue the war in&nbsp;Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The second scenario could materialize if&nbsp;a&nbsp;ceasefire is&nbsp;reached within the next 12 months. Its likelihood depends on&nbsp;Putin: recent concessions suggest agreeing to&nbsp;peace wouldn\u2019t be&nbsp;seen as&nbsp;weakness. We&nbsp;don\u2019t know what the Kremlin wants, but a&nbsp;\u00abpeace\u00bb scenario would remove the crisis from the agenda. Despite massive military spending, Russia\u2019s economy has accumulated significant investment resources. Paradoxically, private business influence has grown over the past three years, and assets under public control have increased (large-scale budget financing inevitably reduces state reserves while profits and incomes concentrate among entrepreneurs and citizens). Even \u00abnew nationalization\u00bb&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/novayagazeta.eu\/articles\/2024\/03\/05\/iziato-dlia-svoikh\">hasn\u2019t fundamentally changed this<\/a>, as&nbsp;redistributed assets don\u2019t exceed 1% of&nbsp;GDP and ultimately remain in&nbsp;private hands. If&nbsp;the war stops, interest rates fall, and business confidence in&nbsp;normalization rises, investment could accelerate, and the near-stalled consumption growth by&nbsp;spring 2025 could resume. Events from February to&nbsp;April 2025, when signs of&nbsp;thawing Russia-West relations amid Trump\u2019s peace efforts led to a&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/ru.investing.com\/indices\/rtsi-chart\">sharp rise<\/a>&nbsp;in&nbsp;Russian stock indices and significant&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.profinance.ru\/chart\/usdrub\/\">ruble strengthening<\/a>, suggest businesses and investors share this view (the author doesn\u2019t support the popular&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.telegraph.co.uk\/business\/2025\/03\/02\/putin-cant-afford-peace-russia-economy-is-hooked-on-war\/\">opinion<\/a>&nbsp;that stopping the war could derail Russia\u2019s economy). However, the final decision rests with Putin, whose motivations and assessments are unpredictable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Why are economic shifts unlikely to&nbsp;halt the war in&nbsp;Ukraine or&nbsp;reduce military spending? The main reason is&nbsp;the lack of&nbsp;agency in&nbsp;Russian society and its groups. For economic problems to&nbsp;trigger political change or&nbsp;a&nbsp;strategy rethink, they must spur actions by&nbsp;social groups. But Russia lacks not only civil society but even business lobbyists and unions. The Putin system\u2019s stability rests on&nbsp;the sharp rise in&nbsp;living standards in&nbsp;the 2000s, which hasn\u2019t significantly declined since (any decline is&nbsp;gradual and barely noticeable \u00abhere and now\u00bb); business is&nbsp;entirely dependent on&nbsp;the state and does not articulate its interests; isolated protests are paralyzed by&nbsp;state terror and fears of&nbsp;losing long-accumulated assets. As&nbsp;a&nbsp;result, the Kremlin&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/ridl.io\/ru\/sobstvennost-i-rabstvo\/\">wields<\/a>&nbsp;immense economic power over society, legitimizing its claim to&nbsp;a&nbsp;large share of&nbsp;the \u00abpie\u00bb for war funding. While polls&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.moscowtimes.ru\/2025\/05\/08\/dolya-vistupayuschih-zaprodolzhenie-voini-rossiyan-upala-dorekordnogo-minimuma-a162998\">show<\/a>&nbsp;some Russian disillusionment with the military operation, open outrage isn\u2019t expected.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The war with Ukraine is&nbsp;Putin\u2019s priority: through it, he&nbsp;aims to&nbsp;demonstrate the possibility of&nbsp;defeating pro-Western forces across the post-Soviet space (and perhaps the West itself). Thus, it&nbsp;won\u2019t end soon (any ceasefire would likely be&nbsp;temporary), and funding military programs will remain the economy\u2019s main task for an&nbsp;indefinite period. Military spending up&nbsp;to&nbsp;8% of&nbsp;GDP doesn\u2019t threaten the economy but precludes development, so&nbsp;the Kremlin\u2019s announced 13.5 trillion rubles for 2025 is&nbsp;likely the ceiling for military spending in&nbsp;the near term, with further real-term growth improbable. Maintaining current spending levels will face hurdles this year (economic stagnation, falling oil prices, potential new sanctions), but these won\u2019t significantly impact funding, which will continue by&nbsp;depleting reserves, raising taxes, and increasing public debt. The projected deficit remains below the 3\u22125% of&nbsp;GDP danger zone and won\u2019t prompt a&nbsp;rethink of&nbsp;Putin\u2019s goals. Over a&nbsp;12\u221218-month horizon, aside from a&nbsp;ceasefire on&nbsp;Putin\u2019s terms, no&nbsp;factors suggest a&nbsp;reduction in&nbsp;military spending. As&nbsp;for economic restructuring, contrary to&nbsp;claims, the economy hasn\u2019t \u00abshifted to&nbsp;war footing\u00bb or&nbsp;been fully subordinated to&nbsp;war tasks. The Kremlin isn\u2019t pushing for militarization comparable to&nbsp;countries in&nbsp;major conflicts. For Russia, the Ukraine war&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.diepresse.com\/19274414\/warum-die-russen-gegenueber-dem-krieg-so-gleichgueltig-sind\">remains<\/a>&nbsp;a&nbsp;\u00abspecial military operation,\u00bb not a&nbsp;war defining society and the economy\u2019s core traits. Thus, economic factors won\u2019t end this aggression.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>20.05.2025By\u00a0Vladislav InozemtsevSource Vladislav Inozemtsev on\u00a0the Russian economy\u2019s ability to\u00a0sustain current levels of\u00a0military spending over the next 12\u221218 months Recent events\u2014fading&hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[29],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3426","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-europe"],"views":703,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3426","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3426"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3426\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3429,"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3426\/revisions\/3429"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3426"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3426"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3426"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}