{"id":3697,"date":"2026-06-17T14:43:32","date_gmt":"2026-06-17T14:43:32","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/?p=3697"},"modified":"2026-06-17T14:43:32","modified_gmt":"2026-06-17T14:43:32","slug":"the-bear-with-the-bomb-russian-nuclear-coercion-and-the-future-of-european-deterrence","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/2026\/06\/17\/the-bear-with-the-bomb-russian-nuclear-coercion-and-the-future-of-european-deterrence\/","title":{"rendered":"The bear with the bomb: Russian nuclear coercion and the future of European deterrence"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">By <a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/profile\/rafael_loss\/\">Rafael Loss<\/a>\u00a0<br>17\/06\/2026<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\"><a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/publication\/the-bear-with-the-bomb-russian-nuclear-coercion-and-the-future-of-european-deterrence\/\" data-type=\"page\" data-id=\"2\">Source<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\"> Russia is expanding its nuclear-capable, long-range weapon systems to press Europe and fracture NATO. Europeans need to plug the gaps in their nuclear capabilities and create a strategic deterrent that can function without US support<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-large\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"576\" src=\"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-9-1024x576.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-3698\" srcset=\"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-9-1024x576.png 1024w, https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-9-300x169.png 300w, https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-9-768x432.png 768w, https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/image-9.png 1280w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Preface<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">It\u2019s time for (another) great debate<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Summary<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\">Russia is building up its arsenal of nuclear-capable long-range weapons and planning for victory in a confrontation with Europe. The Russian goal is to fracture NATO and disrupt the West\u2019s deterrence strategy while extracting political concessions from Europe.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\">Europe has not kept up militarily. Russia will exploit the continent\u2019s gaps in its nuclear capabilities in a crisis or conflict, especially if the US is not around to help fill them.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\">Experts from seven countries in Europe see the continent\u2019s nuclear deterrence as essential, but constrained. They still want NATO to be the primary guarantee of security precisely because of America\u2019s participation.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\">Nevertheless, doubts about US commitment are forcing Europeans to explore alternative initiatives led by Europe\u2019s two nuclear-armed countries, Britain and France.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\">To stave off the Russian threat, Europeans now need to pursue these efforts in earnest. They must shore up their nuclear and conventional strike capabilities, improve their missile defences, and prioritise stronger intelligence-sharing among NATO allies.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading has-medium-font-size\">Mutually assured uncertainty<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">In May 2026, Russia&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/russianforces.org\/blog\/2026\/05\/russia-belarus_non-strategic_n.shtml\">moved<\/a>&nbsp;some of its nuclear warheads to Belarus. The two countries held joint nuclear exercises to practise using the non-strategic nuclear weaponry Vladimir Putin has entrusted to Alexander Lukashenko, his friendly authoritarian neighbour. Moscow also brandished other parts of its nuclear arsenal\u2014the world\u2019s largest and most diversified\u2014during a large-scale exercise&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/t.me\/mod_russia_en\/27047\">spanning<\/a>&nbsp;three days \u201cto prepare and use nuclear forces in the face of the threat of aggression\u201d. In total, the Russian-Belarusian drills involved 64,000 military personnel and over 200 missile launchers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">If Russia can claim victory in its war of aggression against Ukraine, it will partly be thanks to the same nuclear weapons that in May 2026 Putin&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.defensenews.com\/global\/europe\/2026\/05\/20\/russia-launches-unannounced-nuclear-exercise-including-belarusian-launch-sites\/\">paraded<\/a>&nbsp;across north-west Russia\u2019s Leningrad and Central military districts. Russia has not yet deployed these in combat but, since 2014 (and especially since the full-scale invasion in 2022), Western leaders have hesitated to provide specific weapon systems or loosen restrictions on their use by Ukraine\u2019s armed forces. Amid fear of escalation, they have also refrained from supporting Ukraine more directly, for example, by sending troops to fight alongside the Ukrainian army or fighter jets to protect Ukraine\u2019s skies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">So, even short of direct employment, it seems that Russia\u2019s nuclear arsenal has already succeeded in intimidating the West and constraining European support to Ukraine. Now Russia\u2019s developing theory of victory (that is, its strategic framework for how to succeed in conflict), and its military concepts and capabilities, indicate that it is prepared to pursue a nuclearised confrontation in Europe. To achieve its dual goal of fracturing the West and keeping war outside its borders, Russia is ready to fight and win a limited nuclear war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">But Europeans, without the once firm guarantee of US support, have few ideas for how to meet such a challenge\u2014and even fewer capabilities. Instead, they find themselves on the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/bafriedman.substack.com\/p\/what-should-europe-do\">edge of chaos<\/a>, inhabiting the uncomfortable space between order and disorder where a continued loss of coherence in their nuclear strategy and approach to America\u2019s waning support for NATO could eventually lead their deterrence of Russia to fail. Europeans urgently need to unite around a shared vision for credible strategic deterrence and identify how to achieve it. If they do not, Russia could be more emboldened to stage an attack that threatens European territorial integrity and cohesion. &nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">This paper details Russia\u2019s approach for a nuclearised confrontation with Europe and the nuclear and strategic non-nuclear capabilities it would rely on. Drawing on interviews with more than two dozen officials and experts from Estonia, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden, it outlines the lack of coherence in Europe\u2019s current approach towards developing an effective deterrent and suggests how it should amend its strategy to prepare for future Russian aggression. The paper recommends how Europeans can close persistent gaps\u2014in their nuclear forces, conventional long-range strike, missile defence, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems\u2014and shore up their strategic thinking and policy coherence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">The overall goal is for Europeans to form an integrated strategic deterrence posture for themselves. This approach needs to complement the US nuclear umbrella and contribute to burden-shifting in NATO. If the worst came to pass, it should function in lieu of them both. Europe\u2019s two nuclear-armed powers, France and Britain, are central to any such effort, but Europe\u2019s non-nuclear countries cannot leave the conceptual and operational questions to these two. Generating requirements and capabilities for deterrence and assurance that are credible in the eyes of both allies and adversaries will require significant contributions at every level. Failing to do so would allow Putin to bend Europe\u2019s borders and leave behind a fractured, weakened continent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading has-medium-font-size\">The Russian threat<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Putin\u2019s Russia is prepared for war with Europe: it has developed the capabilities and coercion tactics to be able to scare Europeans into acquiescence. To be prepared to face such a conflict, Europe needs to fully understand how Russia expects to fight and win a war with Europe, and what capabilities it has to do so.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">The seed for Russia\u2019s modern military capabilities came in the late 1970s. Then, the emergence of conventional long-range precision weapons caused Moscow\u2019s military thinkers to work hard to understand their implications for conflict with nuclear-armed adversaries. But little practical implementation&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.google.de\/books\/edition\/Russian_Military_Thought\/iUWTEQAAQBAJ?hl=de&amp;gbpv=1&amp;pg=PA112&amp;printsec=frontcover\">followed<\/a>&nbsp;their conceptual efforts. Instead, the US developed the weapons and before the Soviet Union could catch up, it collapsed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Spurred by demonstrations of overwhelming Western airpower in the second Gulf War and in Kosovo, Moscow began&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.researchgate.net\/profile\/Charles-Bartles\/publication\/345212534_Russias_Military_Modernisation_An_Assessment\/links\/5fa09d09a6fdccfd7b977e0c\/Russias-Military-Modernisation-An-Assessment.pdf#page=162\">developing<\/a>&nbsp;a strategic reconnaissance-strike complex\u2014a system to find and strike enemy targets at long range using networked sensors and precision weapons. It modernised old and fielded new nuclear-capable long-range ballistic and cruise missiles as well as sensors and command-and-control systems. The result was a leap in Russia\u2019s threat capabilities: a suite of long-range weapons able to reach far into Europe and to carry conventional\u2014or nuclear\u2014warheads. Russia first&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.mitre.org\/sites\/default\/files\/2021-11\/prs-19-3483-russian-lessons-learned-in-syria.pdf#page=11\">tested<\/a>&nbsp;some of these weapons in Syria after 2015, and has used them regularly against Ukraine since 2022.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Nevertheless, Russia\u2019s inability to coerce Ukraine\u2019s surrender or further constrain Western support by raising the nuclear spectre has led to intense&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.tandfonline.com\/doi\/full\/10.1080\/10736700.2024.2435706#d1e210\">debate<\/a>&nbsp;among Russia-based experts on the strategic use of such nuclear-capable strike systems. But Russia has not abandoned its doctrine or its capabilities. Instead, it is doubling down and expanding production of key weapon systems. Another conflict in Europe involving Russia would likely see even more intense nuclear coercion and larger-scale use of long-range conventional weapons by Russia from the outset. According to Russia\u2019s logic, if at first you do not succeed, escalate and escalate again.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading has-medium-font-size\">Russia\u2019s theory of victory &nbsp;<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Two philosophies have&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.google.de\/books\/edition\/Russian_Military_Thought\/iUWTEQAAQBAJ?hl=de&amp;gbpv=1&amp;pg=PA169&amp;printsec=frontcover\">shaped<\/a>&nbsp;Russia\u2019s strategic outlook since at least the 19th century. They provide the broader context for how some analysts of Russian military strategy\u2014according to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/mid.ru\/en\/foreign_policy\/fundamental_documents\/1860586\/\">official documents<\/a>,&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/en.kremlin.ru\/events\/president\/news\/67843\">leaders\u2019 statements<\/a>,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20191019183039\/http:\/vm.ric.mil.ru\/Stati\/item\/203864\/\">military journals<\/a>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/rochanconsulting.substack.com\/p\/evolution-of-belarusian-nuclear-related\">exercises<\/a>\u2014form a Russian theory of victory. The first philosophy is that the main threat to Russia stems from an \u201cunrelenting\u201d West; the second is that the best way for Russia to protect itself is by \u201cwaging war away from Russia\u201d. These approaches explain Russia\u2019s proclivity to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.cna.org\/reports\/2021\/08\/Russian-Military-Strategy-Core-Tenets-and-Operational-Concepts.pdf\">pre-empt<\/a>&nbsp;perceived threats before they reach Russian territory, and reinforce its desire for buffer zones (<a href=\"https:\/\/table.media\/en\/security\/feature\/armenia-how-russia-is-trying-to-secure-influence-ahead-of-the-elections\">Armenia<\/a>,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/en.belsat.eu\/92427501\/roadmap-to-the-abyss-how-the-kremlin-is-absorbing-belarus\">Belarus<\/a>,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.kas.de\/documents\/d\/ukraine\/yizhak_russia_s_geopolitical_ambitions_eng\">Ukraine<\/a>) in its near abroad. These dual philosophies create a blueprint to understand Moscow\u2019s theory of victory, that is, how Russia would plan to achieve its goals in a conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">This thinking runs through Russia\u2019s strategy today. In December 2021, Russia&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.iiss.org\/online-analysis\/online-analysis\/2022\/01\/russias-new-draft-treaties-like-2009-but-worse\/\">presented<\/a>&nbsp;draft treaties to the US and NATO (which they rejected) to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2021\/12\/17\/world\/europe\/russia-nato-security-deal.html\">reverse<\/a>&nbsp;central and eastern European countries\u2019 efforts to join Euro-Atlantic security structures since 1997\u2014in line with Russia\u2019s first philosophy of \u201cWestern encroachment\u201d. In doing so, Russia attempted to impose limits on its neighbours\u2019 sovereignty and their ability to resist intimidation and domination via diplomacy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Since 2022, Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine has been the most violent expression of this desire. Now that Russia&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/russia-says-eu-is-becoming-vassal-nato-2023-01-11\/\">sees<\/a>&nbsp;NATO and its members, and especially European countries, as vassals of the US and&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.rand.org\/content\/dam\/rand\/pubs\/research_reports\/RRA3900\/RRA3900-1\/RAND_RRA3900-1.pdf#page=29\">rarely<\/a>&nbsp;as independent actors, growing uncertainties around America\u2019s future role in European security and US extended nuclear deterrence are&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/article\/enemy-number-one-what-putins-foreign-policy-speech-says-about-europe\/\">feeding<\/a>&nbsp;Russia\u2019s perception of its advantage. If Russia\u2019s leaders view war to be imminent and inevitable, the Russian theory of victory supposes an immediate, rapid and overwhelming use of military force before the US and NATO can prepare for an attack. &nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Because Russia would be unable to defeat NATO militarily, it would instead selectively impose costs, risks and psychological pressure on NATO leaders and populations. Its&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/cgsr.llnl.gov\/sites\/cgsr\/files\/2024-08\/CGSR-LivermorePaper7_0.pdf#page=59\">aim<\/a>&nbsp;would be to weaken NATO politically and militarily so it can induce acquiescence on key decisions\u2014such as whether to resist Russian aggression or to respond to Russian escalation. As deterrence strategist Brad Roberts&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/cgsr.llnl.gov\/sites\/cgsr\/files\/2024-08\/CGSR-LivermorePaper7_0.pdf#page=59\">argues<\/a>, it could achieve this \u201cby creating an image of a terrible price to be paid in confronting Russia militarily, by creating the expectation that political confrontation would become military confrontation, and by reinforcing the expectation that any military confrontation would be a nuclear confrontation\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Russia\u2019s theory of victory, concepts and capabilities aim to first break NATO; then impose Russia\u2019s political objectives on a helpless and divided Europe. The idea is that Moscow would be able to achieve its long-held ambitions with the West out of the way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading has-medium-font-size\">Russia\u2019s concept for escalation management<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Russia\u2019s dual philosophies on conflict explain the strategic role played by long-range weapons\u2014nuclear and conventional\u2014in Russia\u2019s theory of victory. In this context, strategic non-nuclear weapons do not replace nuclear weapons. Rather, the latter&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.rand.org\/content\/dam\/rand\/pubs\/research_reports\/RRA3800\/RRA3859-1\/RAND_RRA3859-1.pdf\">enhance<\/a>&nbsp;the credibility of the threat to use the former. Long-range weapons mean nowhere in Europe is safe. Russia\u2019s thinking is that their use will deter any European retaliation, because this could always be met with Russia using strategic nuclear weapons in the next round of strikes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Russian military doctrine&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.cna.org\/reports\/2020\/04\/DRM-2019-U-022455-1Rev.pdf#page=14\">distinguishes<\/a>&nbsp;between the fundamental aspects of local, regional and large-scale war; its weaponry is geared towards containing and managing escalation at these separate and distinct scales. As it stands, Russia\u2019s arsenal&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/cgsr.llnl.gov\/sites\/cgsr\/files\/2024-08\/Precision-Strike-Capabilities-report-v3-7.pdf\">consists of<\/a>&nbsp;strategic nuclear, non-strategic nuclear and strategic non-nuclear forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Russia\u2019s strategic weapon toolbox<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\">Strategic nuclear forces: Land-based (Strategic Rocket Forces), sea-based and strategic nuclear aviation forces for\u00a0<strong>global<\/strong>\u00a0deterrence operations.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\">Non-strategic nuclear forces: General purpose forces that have land, sea and air-launched non-strategic nuclear weapons with\u00a0<strong>regional<\/strong>\u00a0uses.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\">Strategic non-nuclear forces: General purpose forces that have strategic non-nuclear weapons, including conventional long-range precision weapons, for launch from land, air and sea (and other domains)<strong>.<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Russian doctrine can&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/cgsr.llnl.gov\/sites\/cgsr\/files\/2024-08\/CGSR_LP4-FINAL.pdf#page=23\">indicate<\/a>&nbsp;which behaviours are likely and the credibility of its threat to use nuclear weapons. According to its strategic toolbox, the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons in a local conflict to achieve limited objectives is unlikely because their use comes at too high a cost. In breaking the nuclear taboo, Russia would risk&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/us-news\/2022\/sep\/25\/us-russia-ukraine-war-nuclear-weapons-jake-sullivan\">roping in<\/a>&nbsp;other nuclear armed powers to respond.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">However, a regional conflict for Moscow would be far more existential. According to its theory of victory, the aim would still be to contain the conflict and avoid escalation to a large scale by fracturing coalitions and deterring major powers from joining. But this time, it could do so by threatening the use of strategic non-nuclear weapons and non-strategic nuclear weapons to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/warontherocks.com\/its-time-to-talk-about-a2-ad-rethinking-the-russian-military-challenge\/\">inflict<\/a>&nbsp;calibrated and selective damage or force capitulation. Here, Russia\u2019s strategic nuclear forces act as deterrence and coercion through escalation dominance: Russia has the nuclear trump card and is not afraid to play it. A regional conflict could thereby facilitate limited and&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/cgsr.llnl.gov\/sites\/cgsr\/files\/2024-08\/CGSR_LP4-FINAL.pdf#page=28\">suggestive<\/a>&nbsp;nuclear strikes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Russian capabilities support this logic as conventional and non-strategic nuclear weapons have no constraints on their&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/cgsr.llnl.gov\/sites\/cgsr\/files\/2024-08\/Precision-Strike-Capabilities-report-v3-7.pdf#page=96\">integrated employment<\/a>. Put simply, most are dual-capable, meaning they can carry both conventional and nuclear payloads. As such, Russian long-range systems and their operating units can&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.cna.org\/reports\/2020\/04\/DRM-2019-U-022455-1Rev.pdf#page=19\">assume<\/a>&nbsp;both strategic non-nuclear and non-strategic nuclear roles or provide conventional fire support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Russian targets for&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.cna.org\/reports\/2020\/04\/DRM-2019-U-022455-1Rev.pdf#page=67\">strategic operations<\/a>&nbsp;include high-value military assets as well as political and economic assets. Among these, strategic operations for the destruction of critically important enemy targets (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.google.com\/url?sa=t&amp;source=web&amp;rct=j&amp;opi=89978449&amp;url=https:\/\/www.rand.org\/content\/dam\/rand\/pubs\/research_reports\/RRA1200\/RRA1233-1\/RAND_RRA1233-1.pdf&amp;ved=2ahUKEwj_0rTouISVAxUDZqQEHVJjInYQFnoECBsQAQ&amp;usg=AOvVaw0uFW7cVFB6WvkBhMgepkw1\">SODCIT<\/a>) use strikes on critical and civilian infrastructure to psychologically affect leaders and populations. Attacks on Ukrainian hospitals and churches stem from Russian thinking on targeting for a strategic effect.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">The war against Ukraine reveals gaps between Russia\u2019s ambition and the capability of its armed forces in the field. Striking mobile targets, such as an Iskander missile launcher, at ranges beyond 500km remains a challenge. Having said that, Russia\u2019s long-range drone forces are&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.twz.com\/news-features\/long-range-drones-used-by-russia-to-attack-ukrainian-trains-official\">improving<\/a>&nbsp;their ability to strike at shorter, tactical-operational depths. So, Russia\u2019s adversaries should not discount its ability for innovation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Despite Russia\u2019s military shortcomings, its military thinkers still see its experience in the war as validating its presumptions about the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.cna.org\/reports\/2025\/08\/Russian-Concepts-of-Future-Warfare-Based-on-Lessons-from-the-Ukraine-War.pdf\">character of modern warfare<\/a>. These range from the importance of long-range precision strike capabilities to using non-military means, such as influencing adversaries decision-making to achieve battlefield and strategic objectives. As Russia\u2019s experiences have merely confirmed its doctrine, trends&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.rand.org\/content\/dam\/rand\/pubs\/research_reports\/RRA1200\/RRA1233-8\/RAND_RRA1233-8.pdf\">visible<\/a>&nbsp;before 2022 could well accelerate, including the deepening integration of nuclear and non-nuclear strategic capabilities in a unified concept for strategic operation. Unlike European doctrine, the threat of nuclear use is integral to a Russian theory of victory; it has the long-range capabilities to give that credibility, and it is likely to keep developing them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading has-medium-font-size\">Russia\u2019s evolving capabilities<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Just as Russia has had its presumptions about modern warfare confirmed in Ukraine, Russian leaders are also learning what capabilities are most effective and how they need to be improved to fight a larger-scale conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Russia has a diverse and growing arsenal of nuclear-capable long-range weapon systems which can be launched from aircraft, surface ships and submarines, or ground launchers. Russia\u2019s programme to modernise its Soviet-era strategic nuclear forces is in its final stages: it is&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.tandfonline.com\/doi\/full\/10.1080\/00963402.2026.2659527\">equipped<\/a>&nbsp;with approximately 2,600 strategic nuclear warheads, of which about 1,800 are permanently deployed on missiles and at bomber bases.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">The dual-capable, long-range strike systems of Russia\u2019s general purpose forces have also improved considerably since the early 2000s. It has Iskander land-based ballistic and cruise missile variants, Kalibr supersonic and Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missiles and Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles. The Russian military is&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.tandfonline.com\/doi\/full\/10.1080\/00963402.2026.2659527\">assigned<\/a>&nbsp;around 1,800 non-strategic nuclear warheads, including&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.state.gov\/2024-report-to-the-senate-on-the-status-of-tactical-nonstrategic-nuclear-weapons-negotiations-pursuant-to-subparagraph-a12b-of-the-senate-resolution-of-advice-and-consent-to-ratification-of\/\">warheads<\/a>&nbsp;for gravity bombs, depth charges, torpedoes, anti-aircraft, anti-ship, anti-submarine, anti-ballistic missile systems and nuclear mines, in addition to other dual-capable missile systems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">In sum, Russia\u2019s nuclear arsenal is larger and more diversified than that of any one NATO country, including America\u2019s. It is ten times bigger than the combined arsenals of Britain and France. But numbers alone cannot&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/theloop.ecpr.eu\/enduring-lessons-or-outdated-logic-updating-europes-nuclear-thinking\/\">tell<\/a>&nbsp;the whole story.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Russia\u2019s long-range systems have&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.rusi.org\/explore-our-research\/publications\/special-resources\/russian-air-war-and-ukrainian-requirements-air-defence\">underperformed<\/a>. In the early days of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, flaws in Russia\u2019s campaign plan and targeting, alongside Ukrainian adaptability, prevented Russia\u2019s long-range attacks from achieving the decisive strategic effect. Russian cruise and ballistic missiles struck targets across the entirety of Ukrainian territory, but Ukraine\u2019s&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.usni.org\/magazines\/proceedings\/2023\/september\/air-denial-lessons-ukraine\">relocation<\/a>&nbsp;of its aircraft, air-defence systems and other critical assets protected them. Ukraine was able to keep Russia from gaining control of the airspace over the battlefield.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Previously&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.rferl.org\/a\/putin-set-give-annual-address-amid-presidential-election-campaign\/29069948.html\">touted<\/a>&nbsp;by Putin as specifically designed to evade missile defences, Ukraine\u2019s Western-provided anti-missile systems have also intercepted Russia\u2019s Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles and its Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missiles in up to a third of cases. This is because these systems decelerate in their final approach to the target. These strikes degraded but failed to disintegrate or disable Ukraine\u2019s armed forces or to produce the psychological pressure to force its surrender.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Despite SODCIT, Russian target lists omitted some of Ukraine\u2019s high-value political, economic and military-related assets (power plants, civil administration, military headquarters, for example). This oversight occurred because Russian leaders&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/static.rusi.org\/359-SR-Ukraine-Preliminary-Lessons-Feb-July-2022-web-final.pdf\">assumed<\/a>&nbsp;that they would quickly depose Ukraine\u2019s leadership and then control these assets through proxies. The same would not be true for the port of Rotterdam or Berlin\u2019s Charit\u00e9 hospital. Planning for a ten-day war against a neighbouring country (essentially a local conflict in Russian doctrine) differs from planning to collapse a coalition\u2019s cohesion in a regional, if not large-scale conflict\u2014such as one with NATO.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Therefore, Russia would consider how to use its strategic toolkit\u2014including its long-range weapons\u2014in a conflict with NATO more expansively than it had initially planned in Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Despite proven weaknesses in its missile systems, Russia is&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.rusi.org\/explore-our-research\/publications\/commentary\/iskander-improved-russian-missile-tests-ukraines-air-defence\">innovating<\/a>&nbsp;to ensure that intercept rates do not creep too high. It is also using other systems, such as the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/luftlage.substack.com\/p\/the-missile-that-came-in-from-the\">Oreshnik<\/a>&nbsp;ballistic missile, which it has fired against Ukraine three times so far. While Oreshnik&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/missilematters.substack.com\/p\/oreshnik-is-overhyped-but-poses-a\">lacks<\/a>&nbsp;precision, this matters less when Russia aims it at large industrial compounds or uses it for indiscriminate terror bombing of urban areas. Imprecision also matters less for Russia when these dual-capable systems carry a nuclear payload, which produce exponentially greater explosive power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Even as Russia continues firing missiles at Ukraine, it is&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/kyivindependent.com\/investigation-russia-expands-strategic-plant-producing-icbms-with-chinas-help\/\">replenishing and expanding<\/a>&nbsp;its stockpiles. Russian solid-propellant rocket motor production, for instance, has grown since 2023. Its strategic nuclear and general-purpose forces depend on&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/apps.dtic.mil\/sti\/pdfs\/ADA425146.pdf\">solid-propellant rocket motors<\/a>&nbsp;for their long-range systems. In mid-2025, Ukrainian intelligence&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/kyivindependent.com\/exclusive-russias-ballistic-missile-production-up-at-least-66-over-past-year-according-to-ukrainian-intel-figures\/\">estimated<\/a>&nbsp;Russian monthly production to be at 60-70 Iskander ground-launched ballistic missiles, 60-70 Kh-101 air-launched cruise missiles, 10-15 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles and at least 75-100 long-range munitions of other types. This is a considerable increase from the year prior, with plans to expand further.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">These numbers suggest that some of Russia\u2019s monthly weapons production ends up in storage; that what Russia fires at Ukraine exceeds the number of anti-missile interceptors the latter receives from the West; and that Russian production exceeds European production of long-range weapons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Russia is also expanding its air capabilities beyond missiles: its long-range drone forces could soon become a strategic non-nuclear asset. In November 2025, the Russian armed forces&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/jamestown.org\/russias-unmanned-systems-forces-become-wildcard-in-moscows-military-modernization\/\">established<\/a>&nbsp;the unmanned systems forces as a separate combat arm akin to the strategic rocket forces. This new organisation institutionalises drone warfare and provides drone forces with a command structure for organising, training and equipping. But Russian military thinkers are still&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.saratoga-foundation.org\/p\/russias-new-unmanned-systems-forces\">contemplating<\/a>&nbsp;whether long-range drones can form an integral part of combined-arms operations to foster coercion and fracture cohesion, like Russian doctrine assumes for dual-capable long-range precision missiles. So far, when Russia combines drones and missiles for attacks against Ukraine, the drones saturate Ukraine\u2019s air defences and improve the ability of missiles to reach their designated targets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">In a conflict with Russia, Europeans would initially confront thousands of drones and missiles. Their deployment would threaten European defences, exacerbate Europe\u2019s psychological and political paralysis, and deepen the current incoherence on nuclear and defence policy across the EU and NATO. Europeans would be right to be anxious.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading has-medium-font-size\">Europe\u2019s nuclear anxiety<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Over the last 20 years, Russia\u2019s dialling-up of nuclear intimidation has not gone unnoticed. In 2007, Putin&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/world\/russia-revives-long-haul-bomber-flights-idUSL17450065\/\">ordered<\/a>&nbsp;the resumption of strategic bomber patrols against European military installations which, along with Russian nuclear-capable tactical fighters, regularly fly mock-attack manoeuvres. In 2015, Russia&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/world\/russia-threatens-to-aim-nuclear-missiles-at-denmark-ships-if-it-joins-nato-shiel-idUSKBN0MI0ML\/\">threatened<\/a>&nbsp;to target the Danish navy with nuclear weapons if it integrated its vessels into NATO\u2019s ballistic missile defence system. Russia\u2019s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 also&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.files.ethz.ch\/isn\/193514\/Nuclear%20Backed%20%E2%80%9CLittle%20Green%20Men%E2%80%9D%20Nuclear%20Messaging%20in%20the%20Ukraine%20Crisis.pdf\">featured<\/a>&nbsp;a flurry of nuclear activities; a playbook it has&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.swp-berlin.org\/publications\/products\/arbeitspapiere\/Horovitz_Smetana_et_al-Russia_Nuclear_Signalling_Chronology_Dec25_LARGE.pdf\">repeated<\/a>&nbsp;since 2022.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">NATO has avoided tit-for-tat responses. Instead, following deep reductions of allied nuclear forces at the end of the cold war, US administrations engaged with NATO\u2019s Nuclear Planning Group and its subordinate forums to maintain support for post-cold-war nuclear-sharing arrangements. In practice, this saw select European countries\u2014Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, as well as Turkey\u2014host US nuclear weapons and provide tactical aviation to the NATO nuclear mission. Fighter jets, nuclear bombs and associated infrastructure have seen upgrades, but NATO still abides by its 1997&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.nato.int\/en\/about-us\/official-texts-and-resources\/official-texts\/1997\/05\/27\/founding-act\">pledge<\/a>&nbsp;to not place nuclear weapons on the territory of \u201cnew members\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Interviews showed that European countries have varying degrees of satisfaction with this setup. Finland and Sweden joined NATO in 2022 for the nuclear deterrent, \u201cafter all,\u201d as one Swedish interlocutor remarked \u201cthere is no Article 5 for a good partner.\u201d They joined without formal caveats on military activity, but have issued political declarations prohibiting the peacetime deployment of nuclear weapons to their territories.<a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/publication\/the-bear-with-the-bomb-russian-nuclear-coercion-and-the-future-of-european-deterrence\/#_ftn1\">[1]<\/a>&nbsp;This aligns with Denmark\u2019s and Norway\u2019s long-standing legal stipulations to that respect, thus maintaining Nordic coherence on nuclear policy.<a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/publication\/the-bear-with-the-bomb-russian-nuclear-coercion-and-the-future-of-european-deterrence\/#_ftn2\">[2]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Dutch officials drive conversations on increasing the visibility of NATO\u2019s nuclear deterrent and adopting conventional long-range precision weapons to bolster NATO\u2019s mix of deterrent capabilities.<a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/publication\/the-bear-with-the-bomb-russian-nuclear-coercion-and-the-future-of-european-deterrence\/#_ftn3\">[3]<\/a>&nbsp;Polish leaders, on the other hand, want to assume a larger role in NATO nuclear sharing by certifying Poland\u2019s F-35A dual-use jets for the nuclear mission or hosting US nuclear weapons.<a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/publication\/the-bear-with-the-bomb-russian-nuclear-coercion-and-the-future-of-european-deterrence\/#_ftn4\">[4]<\/a>&nbsp;Meanwhile, Germany purchased the F-35A specifically to maintain its involvement with the NATO nuclear mission. But in the shadow of US unreliability, Berlin is now seeking a more European approach to nuclear deterrence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">However, most respondents reported productive working-level relations with US counterparts in NATO and bilateral formats, even acknowledging that American leadership is still developing NATO\u2019s deterrence posture. At the same time, they observed fractures stemming from America\u2019s stance on Greenland and Iran, and Trump\u2019s mercurial attitudes. In the words of a Finnish interlocutor, an invasion of Greenland would present \u201ca nasty problem for Nordic cooperation\u201d, and would obliterate the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence. In such a scenario, Russia might take the opportunity to act against NATO countries and European NATO members would have no choice but to still cooperate on finding a deterrent for Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\"><br>With NATO in a bind, most interviewees still believe that their country\u2019s bilateral relationship with America\u2014based on what they see as enduring US strategic interests in the high north, eastern flank and bases in central Europe\u2014will fare well. At the working level, this conclusion makes sense as cooperation with America continues smoothly; where it falls down is that \u201cin the end the American president is who decides\u201d on the extension of its nuclear deterrence, according to a Swedish interviewee.<a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/publication\/the-bear-with-the-bomb-russian-nuclear-coercion-and-the-future-of-european-deterrence\/#_ftn5\">[5]<\/a>&nbsp;Yet, among Europeans, one Estonian interlocutor observed, \u201cwestern Europe is afraid of nuclear war and eastern Europe is afraid of occupation\u201d\u2014this is one division Russia works to deepen and exploit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Amid this uncertainty, France and Britain, Europe\u2019s two nuclear-armed powers, are seeking to strengthen deterrence and alleviate nuclear anxiety in Europe. Their July 2025 Northwood declaration&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.gov.uk\/government\/news\/northwood-declaration-10-july-2025-uk-france-joint-nuclear-statement\">claimed<\/a>&nbsp;that the two nations would respond to any extreme threat to Europe. French president Emmanuel Macron\u2019s \u201cforward deterrence\u201d proposal of March 2026 explicitly aims to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.elysee.fr\/front\/pdf\/elysee-module-26067-en.pdf#page=6\">enhance<\/a>&nbsp;a continental \u201cfeeling of security\u201d, while Britain will resume its role in NATO nuclear sharing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">But where interviewees are keen to engage with France and Britain (Norway\u2019s prime minister described it as a \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.regjeringen.no\/en\/whats-new\/norway-and-france-sign-mutual-defence-agreement\/id3161369\/\">hedging strategy<\/a>\u201d), none believe that their current nuclear postures could compensate for America\u2019s role. British and French domestic political uncertainty further raised doubts for many about the durability of the two\u2019s current initiatives. France\u2019s nuclear doctrine receives considerable scrutiny, with many open questions remaining to be cleared up in consultations and a desire expressed by most interlocutors for France to multilateralise its deterrence outreach and activities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">This predicament could lead to some national governments&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/warontherocks.com\/is-it-time-for-a-nordic-nuke\/\">concluding<\/a>&nbsp;that the only way to prevent Russian domination is to launch their own nuclear-weapons programme. To date, such discussions have been vague and lacked political and military leaders\u2019 buy-in. In any case, they face near insurmountable technical and financial obstacles. One Swedish interlocutor noted that, with regard to developing an independent nuclear capacity, \u201cwhen you know what it means [to do so], you realise it is all just talk.\u201d<a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/publication\/the-bear-with-the-bomb-russian-nuclear-coercion-and-the-future-of-european-deterrence\/#_ftn6\">[6]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">But this perspective could gain further traction if Russian aggression fails to produce a sufficiently forceful response from Britain, France and the US or if nuclear weapons detonate elsewhere. The latter scenario would normalise their use and may prompt nuclear proliferation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">The US nuclear umbrella is irreplaceable for the foreseeable future; Europeans cannot abandon it. But they must build something that approximates its deterrent effects, lest Russian leaders see America abandoning its defence of Europe as an opportunity to apply their theory of victory, concepts and capabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading has-medium-font-size\">How Europeans should create an integrated strategic deterrence posture<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading has-medium-font-size\">The doctrine behind the machine<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Europeans do not need to emulate the US or Russia by developing thousands of nuclear warheads. Rather, they need the ability to negate Russia\u2019s theory of victory by denying it a strategic advantage at key decision points: first to deter conflict and second\u2014if deterrence fails\u2014to manage escalation in line with European objectives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">This is a project for the coming decade. By the mid-2030s, the European integrated strategic deterrence posture, underpinned by credible strategy and concepts, should have&nbsp;<strong>nuclear&nbsp;<\/strong>and<strong>&nbsp;conventional long-range strike capabilities&nbsp;<\/strong>which can credibly threaten devastating retaliation to a Russian attack;&nbsp;<strong>air and missile defences&nbsp;<\/strong>to deny Russia confidence in its long-range coercion strategy; and&nbsp;<strong>intelligence capabilities<\/strong>&nbsp;to outpace Russian moves throughout crisis and conflict. Relying on only one of these assets without integrating it with the others would leave Europe exposed to Russia\u2019s strategic coercion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Meanwhile, a coalition of European leaders, such as a \u201cstrategic posture group\u201d within a European-led NATO and backed by Europe\u2019s brightest deterrence strategists, would ensure collective responsibility, multilateral coherence, joint planning and rapid action to navigate a nuclearised confrontation with Russia. But construction on this project must begin now to allow Europeans to gradually acquaint themselves with the practice of strategic deterrence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">The raison d\u2019\u00eatre of the European integrated strategic deterrence posture is twofold: preserving individual political sovereignty and territorial integrity; and preserving European cohesion. These are mutually constitutive. A loss of country sovereignty would collapse European cohesion, while the loss of cohesion would expose countries to threats to their political sovereignty and territorial integrity. Just as Russia\u2019s theory of victory seeks to affect Europeans\u2019 assessment of the benefits, costs and risks of different courses of action, so should Europe force Russia to assume the costs and risks of escalation at key decision points.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading has-medium-font-size\">What Europeans can do: Six principles behind a deterrent<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Below are a set of principles\u2014the contours of a theory of victory\u2014that should guide a European construction project. Each principle&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/cgsr.llnl.gov\/sites\/cgsr\/files\/2024-08\/CGSR-LivermorePaper7_0.pdf\">aims to dissuade Russia<\/a>&nbsp;from pursuing certain options or objectives towards Europe at key decision points. Together, the principles aim to address Russia\u2019s theory of victory: fracture NATO and prevent getting major powers involved; have escalation superiority; and ultimately threaten use of its nuclear capabilities to deter a European response.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Driving Europe\u2019s deterrent<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\"><strong>Europeans can anticipate and deter a conventional attack by composing a strong forward defence<\/strong>. Should Russia attack this strong forward defence, most\u2014if not all\u2014other European countries would be implicated due to their forward-deployed conventional forces in frontline countries.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\"><strong>Europeans can credibly claim that a Russian attack on a frontline country would not decouple Europeans<\/strong>\u00a0but rather have the same risk for Russia as if it attacked a major European power. This includes Europeans having the ability to forward-deploy nuclear capabilities and multilateralising command-and-control arrangements for strategic non-nuclear long-range strike capabilities.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\"><strong>Europeans can reduce the coercive value of threatened missile attacks<\/strong>, using missile defences to protect high-value military, political and economic assets.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\"><strong>Europeans can sustain power projection<\/strong>\u00a0by protecting assets in their ports, dispersing military forces to reduce their vulnerability, and better defending critical infrastructure across the continent (including in space and cyberspace).<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\"><strong>Europeans can deter Russian use of nuclear weapons with a credible threat to respond<\/strong>. If such deterrence fails and Russia conducts a limited nuclear strike, a European response can show Russia that it miscalculated Europe\u2019s resolve to defend existential stakes.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\"has-medium-font-size\"><strong>Europeans can convince America<\/strong>\u00a0that a regional war between nuclear-armed adversaries would call into question US power, prosperity and credibility and the post-war reputation of nuclear weapons;\u00a0<strong>Europeans can convince Russia<\/strong>\u00a0that it does not have more at stake than America in such a conflict. Europeans remain open to operating alongside US forces and capabilities for a coordinated, if not joint, response to Russian aggression.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">These principles should underpin a European theory of victory which can guide Europe\u2019s deterrence adaptations. It would be counterproductive to try to detach this from&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/csbaonline.org\/uploads\/documents\/NATOs_DDA_Concept.pdf\">NATO strategic documents<\/a>&nbsp;and thinking, because that is how most European countries have come to approach deterrence strategy. Still, a European theory of victory, concepts and capabilities based on their specific deterrence requirements should be narrowly tailored to the Russian threat\u2014and to how Russian leaders&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/cgsr.llnl.gov\/sites\/cgsr\/files\/pubs\/2024-08\/CGSR_Livermore_Paper_13_Russian-Net-Assessment.pdf\">view<\/a>&nbsp;their own strengths and vulnerabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">America\u2019s military prowess, meanwhile, remains central to NATO but must account for multiple nuclear-armed challengers. Regardless of whether America is willing to aid European defence, a US force posture that is optimised for contingencies in the Asia-Pacific or elsewhere is less suited to Europeans and could&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.hurstpublishers.com\/book\/how-the-united-states-would-fight-china\/\">produce<\/a>&nbsp;undesirable escalatory pressures. Europeans therefore need to account for the possible absence of US strategic assets (nuclear and non-nuclear) and leadership. If they fail to do this, it could expose Europe to considerable risks of deterrence failure and defeat in conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Consequently, a European theory of victory guiding the construction of a European integrated strategic deterrence posture needs to differ from how NATO\u2014as an alliance of 32 Euro-Atlantic countries\u2014plans to deter and defend itself against Russia. Several EU members categorically&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/special\/eyes_tight_shut_european_attitudes_towards_nuclear_deterrence\/\">reject<\/a>&nbsp;the notion of nuclear deterrence. This suggests that E5 leaders\u2014Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Poland, possibly alongside Baltic, Dutch, Nordic and Spanish representation\u2014should take the lead instead.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Macron has called for mutual support or&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.elysee.fr\/front\/pdf\/elysee-module-26067-en.pdf#page=2\">shouldering<\/a>&nbsp;between nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities, as well as nuclear-armed and non-nuclear European countries. The following sections therefore elaborate on European conceptual and capability gaps in four interrelated areas\u2014nuclear forces, conventional long-range strike, missile defence, and ISR\u2014and how to close them. These four pillars should make up Europe\u2019s strategic toolkit to realise the six principles outlined above.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading has-medium-font-size\">Nuclear forces<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading has-medium-font-size\">The unique role of Britain and France<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Britain and France, Europe\u2019s two nuclear-armed powers, are adapting their nuclear postures to address the deteriorating security environment. Both initially developed their nuclear deterrents under the umbrella of US extended nuclear deterrence, meaning their forces were historically configured almost exclusively to protect national vital interests rather than carry out the escalation management or damage limitation functions deemed necessary by the US. Nevertheless, since 1974, NATO has&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.nato.int\/en\/about-us\/official-texts-and-resources\/official-texts\/1974\/06\/19\/declaration-on-atlantic-relations\">recognised<\/a>&nbsp;British and French nuclear forces as \u201ccontributing to the overall [strength] of the deterrence of the Alliance\u201d, with London and Paris serving as \u201cseparate centres of decision-making\u201d. Having three potential places of nuclear launch decisions complicates the risk calculus for Europe\u2019s potential adversaries. However, both also shy away from a more fundamental&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/fiia.fi\/en\/publication\/frances-forward-deterrence-strategy\">reappraisal<\/a>&nbsp;of their doctrines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Britain&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.tandfonline.com\/doi\/full\/10.1080\/00963402.2024.2420550\">has<\/a>&nbsp;approximately 260 warheads for its strategic ballistic-missile submarines. The Labour government is set to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.gov.uk\/government\/news\/uk-to-purchase-f-35as-and-join-nato-nuclear-mission-as-government-steps-up-national-security-and-delivers-defence-dividend\">re-establish<\/a>&nbsp;an airborne nuclear capability and resume participation in NATO\u2019s nuclear-sharing arrangements; it is acquiring F-35A fighter jets and has seemingly agreed to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.tandfonline.com\/doi\/full\/10.1080\/00963402.2025.2586980#d1e779\">host<\/a>&nbsp;US nuclear bombs at RAF Lakenheath. On one hand, this enhances the operational credibility of NATO\u2019s nuclear posture by adding another country, its aircraft and bases to the setup. On the other, Trump is jeopardising the effectiveness of Britain\u2019s role by raising doubts about his willingness to risk nuclear escalation on Europe\u2019s behalf and authorise the use of US bombs. And, although Britain\u2019s sea-based strategic deterrent is operationally independent from America, it&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.chathamhouse.org\/2025\/03\/uks-nuclear-deterrent-relies-us-support-there-are-no-other-easy-alternatives\">draws<\/a>&nbsp;from a US-based pool of common missiles. This structural dependence could erode the British strategic nuclear deterrent if the US denies Britain access.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">France\u2019s nuclear forces, by contrast, are operationally and structurally independent from the US. France&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.tandfonline.com\/doi\/full\/10.1080\/00963402.2025.2524251\">has around<\/a>&nbsp;290 nuclear warheads: of these, 240 are assigned to its strategic ballistic-missile submarines, while 50 are designated for the nuclear-armed cruise missiles of France\u2019s land-based and carrier-based nuclear aviation. France, too, plans to expand the airleg of its nuclear deterrent by&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.defense.gouv.fr\/air\/actualites\/retour-dissuasion-nucleaire-luxeuil-saint-sauveur\">reactivating<\/a>&nbsp;Luxeuil-Saint-Sauveur air base; Macron\u2019s nuclear deterrence speech in March 2026&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.elysee.fr\/front\/pdf\/elysee-module-26067-en.pdf\">announced<\/a>&nbsp;an increase of warheads in France\u2019s arsenal. He also reiterated the fundamental link between European collective security and French national security: a \u201cdifferent strategic universe\u201d, he says, has led France to evolve how it operationalises the European dimension of its national interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Macron\u2019s \u201cforward deterrence\u201d proposal&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.rusi.org\/explore-our-research\/publications\/commentary\/macron-offers-promising-vision-nuclear-deterrence-europe\">entails<\/a>&nbsp;steering groups, enhanced cooperation on select non-nuclear capabilities and the participation of European partners in French nuclear exercises. He also advocates for the deployment of French nuclear-capable aviation to other European countries to create an \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.elysee.fr\/front\/pdf\/elysee-module-26067-en.pdf#page=4\">archipelago<\/a>\u201d of dispersed forces across Europe, with the aim of increasing their survivability and establishing a strong link between European partner territory and French deterrence. Some of these activities have variously&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/lerubicon.org\/une-europeanisation-sans-garanties-les-limites-de-la-dissuasion-avancee-francaise\/\">occurred<\/a>&nbsp;in recent years, but Macron\u2019s proposal rationalises them within one framework\u2014with the possibility of further evolution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Macron also explicitly&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/warontherocks.com\/everything-changes-but-nothing-changes-can-france-overcome-its-own-nuclear-doctrine\/\">rejects<\/a>&nbsp;the idea of nuclear sharing, or for France to join NATO\u2019s nuclear consultations and planning. And while the European dimension of France\u2019s vital interest features prominently in the speech, there is no commitment to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/theloop.ecpr.eu\/french-nuclear-doctrine-stability-through-motion\/\">defend<\/a>&nbsp;the vital interests of its allies. For most Europeans, US policy\u2014which has traditionally \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/apps.dtic.mil\/sti\/pdfs\/ADA517286.pdf#page=37\">consider[ed]<\/a>&nbsp;the use of nuclear weapons [\u2026] to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners\u201d\u2014seems to remain the baseline.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">So, despite French and European security being fundamentally linked, forward deterrence is not a French version of extended nuclear deterrence; it is a class of its own,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/lerubicon.org\/une-europeanisation-sans-garanties-les-limites-de-la-dissuasion-avancee-francaise\/\">aimed<\/a>&nbsp;primarily at enhancing the credibility of French nuclear deterrence. After all, French doubts about US extended nuclear deterrence were a key motivator for its independent nuclear weapons programme. In 1961, France\u2019s then-president Charles de Gaulle reportedly&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/history.state.gov\/historicaldocuments\/frus1961-63v14\/d30\">asked<\/a>&nbsp;his American counterpart John F. Kennedy whether the US would \u201ctrade New York for Paris\u201d. Referencing this episode, a Norwegian interview respondent interrogated France\u2019s willingness to \u201crisk Paris for Vilnius\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Our interviewees also questioned the level of European partner involvement in French nuclear operations: if France\u2019s nuclear forces must be able to execute any mission independently, what is the contribution of France\u2019s European partners exactly? British nuclear policy did not elicit the same degree of scrutiny. This is because, as one Nordic interviewee put it, European partners are familiar with Britain\u2019s nuclear grammar by virtue of its participation in NATO nuclear formats and its assigning of nuclear forces to the alliance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">If Britain and France\u2014by virtue of the evolving nuclear landscape and US disengagement from Europe\u2014extend nuclear deterrence to their European partners (recognising that Macron has not offered to do, but that other Europeans would desire it), they will face a similar conundrum to one that has&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/strategicsimplicity.substack.com\/p\/les-defis-de-la-dimension-europeenne\">plagued<\/a>&nbsp;US strategists for decades. How can they ensure that Russia does not perceive its stakes to be greater than Britain\u2019s and France\u2019s in a conflict that plays out close to Russian borders? How can Britain and France resist Russian attempts to de-couple them from European frontline security by imposing calibrated and selective costs, risks and psychological pressure with nuclear and conventional long-range weapons?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Many interviewees commented on what they perceive as limitations to the British and French deterrence posture\u2019s ability to deal with the challenge of limited nuclear employment by Russia. Although Britain retains a low-yield nuclear warhead, this sits atop a submarine-launched ballistic missile. A submarine that depends on invisibility for its survival is by definition a poor instrument for signalling resolve in the face of the threat of limited nuclear use. France\u2019s air-launched nuclear-armed cruise missiles provide for greater operational and signalling flexibility, but its doctrinal limitation to one \u201cunique and non-renewable\u201d nuclear&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.elysee.fr\/front\/pdf\/elysee-module-26067-en.pdf#page=4\">warning shot<\/a>\u2014despite potentially consisting of multiple weapons being employed in one such strike operation\u2014forces France to face a choice. It must either conduct a large-scale strategic nuclear attack if Russia persists and invite retaliation in kind, or fold.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading has-medium-font-size\">Recommendation: Address the imbalance<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Macron&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.elysee.fr\/front\/pdf\/elysee-module-26067-en.pdf#page=5\">posits<\/a>&nbsp;that strategic non-nuclear capabilities, including conventional long-range precision weapons and missile defence, can help manage escalation below the nuclear threshold. But British and French nuclear forces arguably face their greatest challenge in addressing limited nuclear employment for coercive purposes by Russia. Britain and France should ensure their commitment to extended nuclear deterrence is&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/fiia.fi\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/RP5_Theatre-nuclear-weapons-in-NATOs-deterrence.pdf\">based on<\/a>&nbsp;greater flexibility, perhaps through the joint development of a next generation nuclear-armed cruise missile for their air forces. A separate, national development of this system is likely financially&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/policyexchange.org.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/Resolution-Tempered-With-Restraint.pdf\">infeasible<\/a>&nbsp;for Britain, while British collaboration would lessen the budgetary burden of the programme for France. As France and NATO recognise, nuclear-capable aircraft are uniquely able to signal nuclear resolve, including by deploying them to dispersed locations and partner countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Britain and France should also cooperate on nuclear-armed cruise missiles for their submarines. The Royal Navy can manoeuvre military aviation equipment via its carriers, but these do not have a nuclear deterrent role. Furthermore, French carrier-based nuclear aviation would lose some benefits of dispersal when French land-based nuclear aviation begins forward-deterrence operations across Europe. For the cost of one aircraft-carrier strike group (in 1997, construction of the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle was estimated to cost approximately \u20ac3.4bn), either country could expand their fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines and equip each with nuclear-armed and conventional cruise missiles. This provides flexibility in deterring or countering limited nuclear employment by Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Developing an air-launched or submarine-launched low-yield nuclear cruise missile proposal is no quick fix\u2014the production and introduction of new nuclear capabilities is a long game. But this could bring a meaningful and substantial boost to the nuclear component of Europe\u2019s future integrated strategic deterrence posture. If Britain and France decide on this development now, it would send a signal to Russia already that Europeans will not let themselves be intimidated by threats of limited nuclear use.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Beyond such capability adjustments, Britain and France should consult their European partners over nuclear strategy and operational planning, with the aim of&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/warontherocks.com\/eurodeterrent-a-vision-for-an-anglo-french-nuclear-force\/\">determining<\/a>&nbsp;how to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/cgsr.llnl.gov\/sites\/cgsr\/files\/2025-09\/CGSR_Livermore_Paper_16_Between%20Tragedy%20and%20Catastrophe%20WEB_0.pdf\">navigate<\/a>&nbsp;deterrence thresholds. Where ambiguity could be useful for deterrence by creating incalculable risks, Europeans need greater clarity about the collective responsibility of nuclear and non-nuclear countries for European security. Creating a European-led centre of excellence for integrated strategic deterrence&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.act.nato.int\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/2026_COE_Catalogue_v61.pdf#page=5\">may support<\/a>&nbsp;this effort through concept and doctrine development, analysis and education of civilian and military leaders, strategists and operators.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Britain and France should use their long-standing trilateral format on nuclear matters with the US to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.acq.osd.mil\/ncbdp\/nm\/NMHB2020rev\/chapters\/chapter10.html\">remind<\/a>&nbsp;Washington that its interests would be affected amid an escalating war with Russia. Therefore, it is better to sustain cooperation across the Atlantic in order to deter Russian aggression in the first place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading has-medium-font-size\">Conventional long-range strike capabilities<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading has-medium-font-size\">The problem of the US monopoly<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Conventional long-range precision weapons can enhance the operational credibility of nuclear deterrence. They increase the probability that a nuclear strike reaches its designated target by suppressing or destroying adversary missile defences. But this is only the narrowest conception of their use for strategic deterrence and well behind how NATO countries have&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/warontherocks.com\/europe-deterrence-and-long-range-strike\/\">considered<\/a>&nbsp;conventional long-range weapons, or \u201cdeep precision strike\u201d, in recent years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Europeans now see conventional long-range weapons&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.iiss.org\/globalassets\/media-library---content--migration\/files\/research-papers\/2025\/11\/pub25-124-deep-precision-strike-4.pdf\">as useful for<\/a>&nbsp;the battlefield and for strategic purposes, such as deterrence and escalation management. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, however, only the US could&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.amacad.org\/sites\/default\/files\/daedalus\/downloads\/Su2011_Modern-American-Military.pdf#page=47\">afford<\/a>&nbsp;to develop and operate conventional long-range precision strike at scale. This quasi-monopoly in NATO was reinforced by America\u2019s desire to retain control of allied escalation in conflict and led Washington to deny allies access to US-developed long-range weapons. In turn, US allies\u2014apart from nuclear-armed Britain and France\u2014were largely willing to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.tandfonline.com\/doi\/full\/10.1080\/00396338.2026.2678691?scroll=top&amp;needAccess=true#d1e286\">forego<\/a>&nbsp;such capabilities. This allowed the advancement of arms-control objectives, and also meant that the US would shoulder the burden of escalation. But Europeans have realised that, without American forces and capabilities, and US-made weapons and munitions, they possess precious few long-range precision systems; they are potentially ill-equipped to independently deter and manage escalation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Now, amid serious gaps in European land forces, some military leaders&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/posts\/alfons-mais-46744b99_us-truppenabzug-activity-7457453785418743810-93_J?utm_source=share&amp;utm_medium=member_desktop&amp;rcm=ACoAABqt9qsBrcLHh3E2OhBbaSnL43_Ef49r2c4\">are calling to<\/a>&nbsp;prioritise long-range drones and rocket artillery for tactical-operational fire support which extends out to 500km, rather than getting lost in abstractions about deep-precision strike. But, while Europe needs drones and rocket artillery to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/publication\/making-defence-european-again\/#forward-defence\">achieve<\/a>&nbsp;an effective conventional forward-defence posture, they are insufficient against a Russian military whose leaders&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/warontherocks.com\/its-time-to-talk-about-a2-ad-rethinking-the-russian-military-challenge\/\">believe<\/a>&nbsp;it can defeat Europe through superior operational design and strategy. Surrendering the conventional long-range strike echelon also leaves Europeans few counter-escalation options to deter Russian strategic operations, and strengthens Russian perceptions of strategic-operational advantage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">If western European leaders&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/05\/15\/russia-war-game-nato-invasion-baltics-ukraine-putin-germany-ernstfall\/\">hesitate<\/a>&nbsp;to reinforce frontline states for fear of Russian nuclear or conventional attacks on their countries, tactical fires to support these manoeuvring brigades are for nothing. However, if Europe does not adapt its nuclear posture, a conventional counterstrike strategy alone will not deter Russia from threatening limited nuclear employment in response.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading has-medium-font-size\">Recommendation: Use geography to Europe\u2019s advantage<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">A lesson from Ukraine has been to \u201chit the archer, not the arrow\u201d. In practice, this means suppressing adversary missile attacks by targeting launchers and associated logistics and command-and-control nodes, rather than trying to intercept them with missile defences. At scale and in depth, such a deep-strike campaign could deny Russia use of its dual-capable long-range missiles for coercion. Currently, however, Europeans would struggle to identify and target Russian mobile launchers over vast distances without US assets; Russian missile production is also outpacing Europe\u2019s, which hardly promises success for Europeans either.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Rather than seeking to deny Russia\u2019s missile-based coercion strategy, Europeans should also&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/warontherocks.com\/denial-wont-do-europe-needs-a-punishment-based-conventional-counterstrike-strategy\/\">threaten<\/a>&nbsp;punishment and retaliation against high-value targets if Moscow opted to attack. Ukraine is improving its ability to hit Russia\u2019s oil and gas infrastructure and put pressure on its state budget; stationary targets, including industries that serve Russia\u2019s armed forces, such as weapons and munitions factories, are also fair game. But Ukraine\u2019s experience also shows that achieving a sustained effect\u2014that is, preventing the repair and reconstitution of this infrastructure\u2014requires sustaining the strike campaign, which in turn requires many weapons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">The concept of&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.foreignaffairs.com\/world\/battles-precise-mass-technology-war-horowitz\">\u201cprecise mass\u201d<\/a>\u2014large numbers of affordable long-range drones\u2014coupled with fewer but more capable ballistic and cruise missiles\u2014could provide Europeans with a&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.cnas.org\/publications\/commentary\/strengthen-indo-pacific-deterrence-by-enhancing-americas-warfighting-edge\">high-low mix<\/a>&nbsp;of long-range strike systems. Depending on geography, their ranges would not necessarily need to exceed 1,000km to hold high-value targets at risk; from northern Europe, for instance, shorter-range weapons could cover much of Russia\u2019s north-western&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/urn.fi\/URN:ISBN:978-951-25-3478-4\">Leningrad military district<\/a>. Given most of central Europe is land, ground-launched long-range options are particularly relevant, while sea-launched systems are useful in the high north; ships or submarines in the western Pacific could strike Russia\u2019s far east. Air-launched weapons provide flexibility across different geographies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">The locations from which military forces operate can further enhance the credibility of alliance commitments. During the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.cornellpress.cornell.edu\/book\/9781501766022\/euromissiles\/\">Euromissiles<\/a>&nbsp;crisis of the 1980s, Europeans called for the deployment of US nuclear-armed long-range weapons to Europe to maintain strategic balance with the Soviet Union and prevent a de-coupling of European and North American security. The 2024 agreement between Washington and Berlin to deploy the US army\u2019s conventional long-range precision weapons to Germany&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.bundesregierung.de\/resource\/blob\/992814\/2298420\/6107dc3f9949443ad6b84ee0ae383a83\/2024-07-10-joint-statement-usa-ger-nato-gipfel-data.pdf?download=1\">followed<\/a>&nbsp;a similar \u201ccoupling\u201d logic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">In 2016, NATO established small multinational battlegroups in several frontline countries to implicate many allies in a Russian attack against one ally. These are growing and should become a robust forward-defence posture. If NATO also introduces conventional ground-launched systems ranging several thousands of kilometres, these could facilitate rearward deployments of Baltic long-range strike forces: new long-range fire battalions in Britain, France and Germany would include Baltic missile batteries under specialised command-and-control arrangements. This more continuous strategic depth could then prevent Russia from geographically isolating its target of aggression and give frontline countries a genuine stake in Europe\u2019s integrated strategic deterrence posture akin to NATO\u2019s nuclear-sharing arrangements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Allied governments&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2024\/02\/28\/nato-russia-ukraine-war-shape-command-center-headquarters-military-reforms\/\">approved<\/a>&nbsp;the resumption of planning for strikes against targets deep inside Russia in 2023. NATO has also advanced discussions on the operational and doctrinal implications of conventional long-range precision weapons and formulated corresponding capability requirements; their command and control should largely reside with NATO\u2019s Joint Force Commands, as&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/publication\/making-defence-european-again\/#readying-europe-for-wartime-escalation-management\">proposed<\/a>&nbsp;elsewhere. The European Long-Range Strike Approach,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.defense.gouv.fr\/sites\/default\/files\/ministere-armees\/Communiqu%C3%A9_Signature%20de%20la%20lettre%20d%E2%80%99intention%20sur%20une%20%C2%AB%20approche%20europ%C3%A9enne%20sur%20la%20frappe%20%C3%A0%20longue%20port%C3%A9e%20%C2%BB%20par%20le%20ministre%20et%20ses%20homologues%20allemand%2C%20italien%20et%20polonais.pdf\">launched<\/a>&nbsp;by France, Germany, Italy and Poland in July 2024 and subsequently joined by Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden, aims to generate European-developed varied deep-strike capabilities. But progress has been&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/missilematters.substack.com\/p\/a-european-sonderweg-in-long-range\">incremental<\/a>&nbsp;at best\u2014now Europeans must accelerate it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading has-medium-font-size\">Air and missile defence<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading has-medium-font-size\">Beyond concealment<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">As discussed, air and missile defence can enhance the operational credibility of nuclear deterrence by protecting nuclear assets from adversary air and missile attacks. Britain and France, however, have historically prioritised concealment and dispersal above active missile defence to protect their nuclear submarines and aircraft. They have opted to maintain only limited numbers of ground-based air-defence systems, which they use for roles other than protecting nuclear assets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Non-nuclear Europeans also did&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.iiss.org\/globalassets\/media-library---content--migration\/files\/publications---free-files\/strategic-dossier\/pds-2025\/chapters\/iiss_progress-and-shortfalls-in-europes-defence_2025_ch-3_integrated-air-and-missile-defence.pdf\">not prioritise<\/a>&nbsp;air and missile defence after 1991, partly over doubts that they could&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2018\/03\/28\/patriot-missiles-are-made-in-america-and-fail-everywhere\/\">deliver<\/a>&nbsp;the desired levels of protection against modern missile threats. Their reliability under combat conditions and at beyond-tactical ranges has been demonstrated only relatively recently, with Western-produced missile defence systems successfully&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/mod.gov.ua\/en\/news\/ukrainian-air-defense-intercepted-nearly-92-of-drones-amid-intensified-aerial-attacks-in-may\">intercepting<\/a>&nbsp;Russian long-range ballistic and cruise missiles in Ukraine (and Iranian missiles in the Middle East).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">But a European integrated strategic deterrence posture requires a missile defence system with a clear capability: in the event of a Russian attack, it must protect British, French and NATO nuclear bases in Europe, and&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.rusi.org\/explore-our-research\/publications\/commentary\/russias-options-theatre-missile-coercion\">blunt<\/a>&nbsp;attempts to exert pressure on Europeans by employing strategic non-nuclear and (potentially) non-strategic nuclear weapons at scale. In the \u201cdecisive\u201d initial period of war and at other key decision points during a conflict, Russia would try to confront Europeans with the dilemma: do they resist and endure further pain, or fold?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Air and missile defence to protect high-value military, political and economic assets could also deter Russia from conducting strikes in the first place. It can do this by reducing the probability that a missile will reach its target and making it harder for Russia to calculate how much damage it needs to inflict,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.cna.org\/reports\/2020\/04\/DRM-2019-U-022455-1Rev.pdf#page=34\">in order to compel<\/a>&nbsp;European de-escalation. Rather than undermining Russia\u2019s strategic nuclear deterrent, missile defence aims to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.globsec.org\/sites\/default\/files\/2026-05\/Defending%20Europe%2C%20Deterring%20Russia%20-%20Air%20and%20Missile%20Defence%20Priorities%20to%202030%20ver2%20web%20nonprint.pdf\">deny<\/a>&nbsp;Russia any advantage it can gain through its own strategic non-nuclear and non-strategic nuclear assets. An effective missile defence also buys time and flexibility for decisionmakers and improves escalation-management options.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading has-medium-font-size\">Recommendation: Improve procurement frameworks<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Efforts are underway to at least&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/aerospace-defense\/nato-needs-400-increase-air-missile-defence-rutte-will-say-london-2025-06-09\/\">quadruple<\/a>&nbsp;NATO\u2019s air and missile defence assets. Europeans should now base their defence from Russian missiles and other air threats on European networks and cloud infrastructure, since these require diverse and dispersed radars and other sensors for detecting, identifying and tracking. They also rely on command-and-control systems that fuse this data for comprehensive situational awareness and to guide interceptors to their targets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Russia\u2019s combined drone-missile attacks could well number over 1,000 individual systems; only AI can meet these requirements at speed and on a continental scale, and it requires cloud infrastructure to process the data and digital networks to relay relevant information on direction, targets and timing. Leaving this vulnerable to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/article\/code-clouds-satellite-the-defence-layer-europe-should-not-outsource\/\">disruption<\/a>&nbsp;is risky; Europeans need to strengthen the nervous system of NATO\u2019s Integrated Air and Missile Defence architecture and make it more suitable for specifically European use. But it also needs to maintain interoperability to plug in sensors and interceptors for whichever allied country they are being provided by or procured from.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Moreover, European procurement frameworks should distinguish between owner and operator, like the cold-war-style, US-West Germany cost-sharing agreement in which German soldiers&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.defensenews.com\/opinion\/2023\/12\/27\/whats-old-is-new-again-how-to-boost-natos-air-defenses-in-europe\/\">operated<\/a>&nbsp;US-owned air defence systems. An updated version could see smaller European countries use assets owned collectively (for example, by the EU or NATO) or by larger European countries and thereby make it easier for Europeans to scale up their air and missile defences. NATO\u2019s&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.japcc.org\/articles\/the-multinational-multi-role-tanker-transport-fleet-programme\/\">Multinational Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet<\/a>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.japcc.org\/articles\/alliance-future-surveillance-and-control\/\">Airborne Early Warning and Control Force<\/a>&nbsp;already follow similar models.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">But using missile defences to always protect all of Europe\u2019s territory, against all possible threats, is technically infeasible and prohibitively expensive. In any case, some assets are more efficiently protected from missiles through operational or infrastructure adaptations, including concealment and dispersal. For example, Europeans should consider&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/direct.mit.edu\/isec\/article\/50\/1\/118\/132730\">hardening<\/a>&nbsp;of shelters and storage sites for military equipment and munitions, and other protections. This, combined with jamming missile-guidance systems to confuse their terminal approach and prevent direct hits, also enhances the survivability of targets. The same goes for protecting civilian decision-making centres. Ukraine has demonstrated how moving its air-defence assets in February 2022\u2014and keeping them moving ever since\u2014has made it harder for Russia to strike them. Europeans would do well to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.defensenews.com\/news\/your-military\/2026\/03\/16\/iran-missile-strike-damages-five-kc-135-tankers-in-saudi-arabia-officials-say\/\">internalise<\/a>&nbsp;these lessons more thoroughly than US Central Command arguably had.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading has-medium-font-size\">Strategic intelligence and targeting<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading has-medium-font-size\">Europe\u2019s intelligence gap<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">NATO&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.nato.int\/en\/what-we-do\/deterrence-and-defence\/joint-intelligence-surveillance-and-reconnaissance\">defines<\/a>&nbsp;intelligence as the product of surveillance and reconnaissance supplemented with expertise and further analysis. Thus, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance are understood in tandem; capabilities that allow for better surveillance and reconnaissance facilitate better intelligence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">ISR is essential to a European integrated strategic deterrence posture. It forms the basis for early-warning systems which ensure the protection of high-value military, political and economic assets. Allies can use ISR to monitor Russian activity and discover when assets are being repositioned or moved\u2014and assess whether this action threatens NATO. Good intelligence helps to anticipate adversary courses of action and allows NATO countries to alert and position their forces, including air and missile defence systems to intercept Russian missiles or, if necessary, offensive strike capabilities to target Russian missile launchers. Thus, ISR capabilities contribute to escalation management by providing NATO with a better understanding of Russian capabilities and (where possible) whether Moscow intends to deploy them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Conventional military equipment like&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/bonvaero.com\/isr-drones\/\">uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAV)<\/a>, aircraft and&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/naval-forces.info\/signals-intelligence\/\">ships<\/a>&nbsp;can be equipped with signals intelligence and communication interception technology (<a href=\"https:\/\/euro-sd.com\/2025\/06\/articles\/44849\/skybound-scanners-rebuilding-europes-airborne-sigint-fleet\/\">SIGINT<\/a>) to conduct ISR operations. SIGINT capabilities intercept communication signals and signals from radar systems to gather information about enemy movements and plans: they are the \u201cears\u201d of intelligence gathering, while the \u201ceyes\u201d (imagery and geospatial intelligence, or IMINT) collect information via aerial and satellite photography.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">As it stands, Europe lacks sufficient systems and the capabilities to carry out ISR separately from America. Its over-reliance on US intelligence sharing for military missions became evident in the lead up to Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 when American (and British) intelligence reports uncovered Russia\u2019s&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.iiss.org\/online-analysis\/military-balance\/2025\/03\/europes-air-of-dependence\/\">intention to invade<\/a>. The US also has the advantage of speed: it could use data from satellite imagery and intercepted military communications to generate a warning for Europe and Ukraine within hours. This is a process&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/ng-interactive\/2026\/feb\/20\/a-war-foretold-cia-mi6-putin-ukraine-plans-russia\">which experts predict<\/a>&nbsp;would take the equivalent European agencies multiple days.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Europe does not have sufficient space-based and uncrewed ISR systems, nor the requisite ships and aircraft equipped with SIGINT abilities. In fact, it has only three \u201cbig wing\u201d signals intelligence aircraft for gathering electronic and communications intelligence, where the US Air Force has 17. Meeting the requirement for eight such aircraft could&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.iiss.org\/globalassets\/media-library---content--migration\/files\/research-papers\/2025\/05\/defending-europe-without-the-united-states\/iiss_defending-europe-without-the-united-states_costs-and-consequences_052025.pdf#page=20\">cost<\/a>&nbsp;Europeans an estimated $4-4.8bn. Only a few European navies&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/naval-forces.info\/signals-intelligence\/\">operate<\/a>&nbsp;SIGINT ships that collect data at sea, a capability which is increasingly important in the Nordic and Baltic regions. Perhaps most troubling, Europe is unlikely to be able to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.defensenews.com\/global\/europe\/2025\/02\/25\/mind-the-gaps-europes-to-do-list-for-defense-without-the-us\/\">replace<\/a>&nbsp;America\u2019s space-based ISR capabilities within the next five to ten years. Modern-day satellites, which are critical for ISR, are able to identify specific weapons, vehicles and even people. Europe would need to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.iiss.org\/globalassets\/media-library---content--migration\/images-delta\/publications\/research-papers\/2026-new\/space-report\/advancing-european-military-capacity-in-space.pdf#page=17\">invest<\/a>&nbsp;more than $4.8bn in space-based ISR capabilities (and related ground-based infrastructure) to be able to operate such systems autonomously from the US.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Happily, when it comes to intelligence, Europeans are not starting from scratch. In fact, certain European allies are crucial providers of intelligence, even to the US. During interviews for this paper, respondents from Norway highlighted the country\u2019s role as the \u201ceyes and ears\u201d of NATO due to its position in the high north, which allows it to monitor Russian activity in and around the Kola peninsula (the home of its nuclear submarines and Northern Fleet). Additionally, Swedish intelligence services were the first to report on the Chernobyl disaster. But there is a lot of work to do.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h5 class=\"wp-block-heading has-medium-font-size\">Recommendation: Integrate Europe\u2019s ISR capabilities<\/h5>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">European allies need to invest in the above capabilities and address their ISR gap with the US. They should continue to acquire capabilities that carry out surveillance and reconnaissance, and better integrate the resulting data to produce high-level intelligence. More urgently, they should invest in a greater quantity of aircraft, ships and UAVs equipped with SIGINT and IMINT sensors\u2014and acquire the necessary satellite technology for ISR, such as NATO\u2019s Aquila satellite constellation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Europe\u2019s sophisticated satellite systems are generally designed for civilian use and not&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/kubilius-commission-mulls-new-military-intel-satellites\/\">optimised<\/a>&nbsp;to provide real-time updates to track military movements. But the EU\u2014via the European Defence Fund in particular\u2014could generate the funds necessary to develop and invest in this technology, and facilitate public-private partnerships for developing dual-use satellite networks. The European Defence Fund has&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu\/system\/files\/2023-06\/ODINS%27EYE%20II-Factsheet_EDF22.pdf\">agreed on funding<\/a>&nbsp;for the EU\u2019s ODIN\u2019S EYE initiative, a multinational effort to develop a space-based missile early-warning architecture to detect and track the launch of ballistic missiles. The EU can also further reduce its overreliance on the US by encouraging commercial satellite companies to enter into government contracts, like Finnish company ICEYE is planning for the Netherlands and Poland.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Crucially, Europeans need to consolidate their approach to information sharing and intelligence. The processing of surveillance and reconnaissance data is fragmented, partly because European intelligence is being guarded at the national level and only shared when necessary. Many European countries have robust national intelligence agencies, including France\u2019s Directorate General for External Security (DGSE), Germany\u2019s Federal Intelligence Service (BND), Italy\u2019s External Intelligence and Security Agency (AISE) and Britain\u2019s Defence Intelligence\u2014but they&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/adblocker-expert.net\/do.php?_d=dytr6Vvs88c&amp;_k=27978500&amp;_g=68fad5103a65b8e4654ffde323abca35&amp;_f=tr&amp;_j=12&amp;_i=1302718\">have their own policies<\/a>&nbsp;and legal frameworks for intelligence sharing and technology gaps, which cause variation in quality across countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Initiatives like the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/nisrf.nato.int\/home\/about-us\">NISRF<\/a>,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/web.ifc.bices.org\/\">NIFC<\/a>&nbsp;and the EU\u2019s&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/euintelligence.com\/intelligence\/european-union-intelligence-and-situation-centre-eu-intcen\/\">INTCEN<\/a>&nbsp;are already in place to better process intelligence, but a more concerted effort should be undertaken by alliance members to improve the functionality and capability of these mechanisms. The BND\u2019s proposal to replicate&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.dni.gov\/index.php\/ncsc-how-we-work\/217-about\/organization\/icig-pages\/2660-icig-fiorc\">Five Eyes<\/a>&nbsp;by creating a \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.grosswald.org\/german-foreign-intelligence-service-bnd-proposes-euro-eyes-european-intelligence-sharing-alliance-to-counter-security-threats\/\">Euro Eyes<\/a>\u201d intelligence-sharing alliance may help reduce fragmentation further: the Dutch government&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/new-dutch-government-floats-european-five-eyes\/\">suggested<\/a>&nbsp;that this format could include Britain, France, Germany, Poland and the Nordic countries, alongside the Netherlands. Britain could potentially guide it, based on its&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/eastasiaforum.org\/five-eyes\/\">experience<\/a>&nbsp;as a Five Eyes member.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading has-medium-font-size\">Fracture clinic<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Russia has long prepared for how to use nuclear and strategic non-nuclear weapons to defeat the West away from its home front. To limit Europe\u2019s capacity to respond, Russia wants to fracture NATO\u2014and it has the required nuclear and strategic non-nuclear capabilities to do so. With the transatlantic alliance already in a more precarious state than it was a few years ago, Europe needs to prepare to face Russia on its own.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">A European integrated strategic deterrence posture rests on investing in military capabilities that allow for greater freedom of action in the face of Russian nuclear coercion; and to prevail without having to go to war. This requires work from Europe\u2019s nuclear and non-nuclear allies. France and Britain must continue investing in nuclear capabilities, specifically to enhance their flexibility to respond to limited nuclear employment for coercive purposes by Russia. They also need to work with Europe\u2019s non-nuclear allies to develop conventional long-range strike capabilities which can credibly threaten devastating retaliation to a Russian attack; air and missile defences to deny Russia confidence in its long-range coercion strategy; and intelligence capabilities to outpace Russian moves throughout crisis and conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Also required is the strategic-political leadership of a strategic posture group, an operational command and control of (non-nuclear) capabilities through European-led joint force commands, and intellectual capacity building via a centre of excellence for integrated strategic deterrence. All the above investments will reinforce forward defence and help Europe realise the six key principles they need to negate Russia\u2019s theory of victory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Ultimately, this specific European integrated strategic deterrence posture is just one proposal responding to the concerns and expectations European officials and experts expressed in the research interviews. It does not present a definitive solution; on the contrary, we welcome challenges to it. But Europeans urgently need to be able to start pushing through the chaos. Otherwise, their persistent incoherence amid American disengagement may be perceived by Russian leaders as an opportunity to apply their coercion strategy and capabilities against Europe.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>By Rafael Loss\u00a017\/06\/2026 Source Russia is expanding its nuclear-capable, long-range weapon systems to press Europe and fracture NATO. Europeans need&hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[36],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3697","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-editors-choise"],"views":314,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3697","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3697"}],"version-history":[{"count":16,"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3697\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3716,"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3697\/revisions\/3716"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3697"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3697"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/geopolitic.info\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3697"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}