07/01/2025
By James Johnson
As Donald Trump’s inaugural day draws near, there is talk of conditions and guarantees for a truce between these two Slavic nations, each with their own demands and visions.
On 24 February this year, it will be three years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Despite Moscow’s efforts to present the result of its madness as a victory, the so-called ‘SMO’ (Special Military Operation) proved to be anything but a walk in the park for Russian troops.
Russia’s personnel losses amount to at least 600,000, according to the most conservative estimates of Western intelligence services, including recent statements by Donald Trump. Hundreds and thousands of units of military equipment have been scrapped, and Russia’s military-industrial complex can barely cope with the resulting deficit.
As far as the economic aspect is concerned, there is hardly a single argument in favour of the narrative of victory. In the early months of the war, as many as a million skilled workers left Russia, and the continuing influx from the Caucasus indicates a severe lack of manpower, mainly due to the huge casualties at the frontline.
The allocation of a third of the annual budget to military needs has left holes in other sectors of the economy and social services. There are at least 6,000 communal accidents in Russia every month, inflation will be close to 10% by the end of 2024, and housing and utility tariffs will rise by 12% this year.
Russia’s foreign trade and foreign policy are also in crisis. Under the pressure of sanctions, Russia has lost its premium gas and oil markets, ceding them to OPEC countries and the United States. About $300bn of its currency reserves are frozen in Western banks, with the prospect of their use as reparations for Ukraine.
As a result, Moscow has been forced to sell energy resources to India and China at unprecedentedly low prices. And in the case of the latter, it has even authorised deforestation in Siberia and the Far East, transferring more than a million hectares of Russian land to Chinese companies on long-term leases, in contrast to just over 67 thousand square metres of Ukrainian land seized since 2014.
Let us not forget that Putin’s pretext for the “SMO” was to prevent NATO’s eastward expansion, but this again went wrong. On the contrary, NATO’s border with Russia doubled in almost three years with the addition of Finland in 2023 and later Sweden in 2024.
Reputationally, Vladimir Putin continues to top the list of losers among world leaders. His political short-sightedness has prompted other once-aligned states, particularly from the CSTO, to think twice about the prospects of rapprochement with Moscow. And the failure of the Russian campaign in Syria has completely undermined confidence in the Russian leader.
It is fair to note that the Kremlin’s notorious “red lines” also tend to expand indefinitely, as the last few months of war have shown. The delivery of F16s to the Ukrainian armed forces and the White House’s permission to fire long-range ATACMS missiles deep into Russian territory have not led to any escalation.
President Putin, who was re-elected last year, and his loyal propaganda spokesmen are therefore clearly facing a dilemma as to how and in what perspective to present the results of the “SMO” as a victory to the Russian people. But such a possibility is completely out of reach without a full occupation of the Donbass.
But there is still work ahead. Despite the apparent success of the past year, the advance through every metre of Donbass land and the occupation of every new village there is costing Russia unimaginable resources, as they are up against Ukrainian forces that are defending themselves firmly and effectively.
We must also mention the counter-offensive of the Ukrainian armed forces in the Kursk region, with the seizure of more than 100 settlements already on the territory of the aggressor itself. So far, Russia has not succeeded in expelling the Ukrainians, and has even been forced into asking the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for help, but even such desperate measures are proving unsuccessful.
Summing up all the facts and arguments, we can draw a very simple conclusion. Although both sides in the military conflict are trying to emerge victorious, it is unlikely that any of them will succeed completely. After all, both Russia and Ukraine are on the brink of their military and economic capacities.
The signing of the ceasefire document will largely depend on the decision of President-elect Donald Trump and the position of his Chinese counterparts on the issue. Fortunately, both sides understand the urgent need to end the already prolonged bloodshed in Eastern Europe. Ukraine needs guarantees from Russia about the future inviolability of its borders, and Russia needs at least some arguments for its citizens that “SMO” was not in vain.
Whatever points and compromises we see in this document when it is signed, Russia will most likely face a difficult period of restructuring and turbulence. After all the sacrifices and efforts, the sale to the people of a piece of Ukrainian land in ruins as a victory is no easy task.
Moreover, the US is not interested in a total Russian triumph. This could encourage other authoritarian countries and radical groups to change state borders by force, leading to new war and more bloodshed.
Ukraine, on the other hand, resisted the onslaught of Russian forces that were superior in strength and resources and did not lose its independence and sovereignty, although not without the help of its Western allies. So, in a global sense, it was a victory, not on the scale it was supposed to be, but a victory nonetheless.